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utopias devised by 
committees and 
seeds of change in 
the real world 
Marshall Wolfe* 
International normative declarations on devel-
opment combine two types of demands that 
derive from different views oí human societies 
and their future. One type envisages equality for 
Third World countries within a reformed world 
order retaining sources of dynamism not very 
different from the present. The other type of 
demand, for 'another development' , envisages 
equality for human beings within a world order 
governed by radically different social relation-
ships, values and incentives. The mixing of these 
two types of demands, and the failure to make 
explicit their different theoretical and valorative 
premisses, while unavoidable in international 
forums seeking consensus, weakens the convinc-
ingness of the declaration either as packages of 
demands negotiable between governments oras 
mobilizing myths seeking to replace the waning 
myth of economic development. 
The present paper prefers the values under-
lying the demands for "another development", 
but questions whether these values are going to 
be realized harmoniously and predictably once 
committees of thinkers hit on the correct combi-
nation of planning and exhortation. The paper 
then explores the mutations or "seeds of change" 
that can be detected in different kinds of central 
and peripheral national societies in relation to 
the real prospects for "another development". It 
concludes that the mutations point to a highly 
indeterminate future, in which the capacity of the 
dominant forces in the central countries to 
exercise hegemony for coherent purposes will 
probably decline. The future of Latin America is 
thus not predetermined by the region's present 
pattern of semi-development nor its insertion 
into the international order. The basic proposi-
tions of "another development" may acquire 
greater realism and political viability in the 
hands of new social forces. 
"Consultant t(i CEPAL. 
I 
A new egalitarian world 
order for nation-States or a 
new egalitarian world 
order for human beings? 
In the extraordinary recent flowering of 
normative declarations on development one 
can distinguish two main strands.1 One 
strand consists of relatively concrete de-
mands for egalitarian reforms in the interna-
tional economic order. The other strand 
consists of relatively diffuse appeals for 
'unified development', 'integral develop-
ment' or 'another development' within 
countries, supported by a worldwide trans-
formation of values and priorities. At first 
sight, the two strands complement each 
other, but the manner of their juxtaposition 
within the declarations suggests a series of 
compromises between quite different views 
of human societies and their 'development', 
a new phase in the long-continued efforts to 
define this elusive concept, with the holders 
of different positions contributing additional 
utopian-normative elements and seeking 
common ground with each other under the 
impact of the multifaceted international 
crisis of the mid-1970s.2 Although the dichot-
omy between 'developed' countries and the 
Third World dominates the declarations, the 
differences in the preoccupations of their 
architects do not coincide with this dividing 
line. 
The former demands envisage the 
achievement of equality by the Third World 
countries or by their economic systems 
within an international order continuing to 
derive its dynamism from production for 
export and from international flows of invest-
ment and technological innovation. They 
suppose that 'development' for the Third 
' T h e production of declarations and reports along 
these lines gathered momentum in 1974 and reached a 
peak in 1975. Since 1975, the flow has continued at a 
somewhat slower rate, and with considerable repetition 
of propositions and demands. 
2
 For a discussion of earlier stages of this quest, see 
Marshall Wolfe, El desarrollo esquivo: Exploraciones 
en la política social y la realidad sociopolítico, Mexico, 
D.F., Fondo d e Cultura Económica, 1976. 
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World countries can continue to mean what 
it has meant for the countries now rich and 
industrialized —mass production and mass 
consumption continually stimulating each 
other to new heights— but with the cyclical 
crises, struggles for markets, exploitation of 
the weak by the strong, ravaging of the 
human environment, and other disbenefits 
of such development tamed by some combi-
nation of global planning, bargaining, and 
good will. 
It may be questioned whether an inter-
national economic order reformed by inter-
governmental agreements while retaining 
central mechanisms and motivations of the 
present order can really function in this way, 
or whether the forces that are likely to 
dominate during the foreseeable future will 
really be disposed to make the experiment. 
At least, however, these are demands on 
which governments can base strategies and 
seek united action among themselves. They 
respond to a supposition that countries have 
common and internally harmonious inter-
ests voiced by their governments; that 
overcoming the poverty of a country and 
gaining it an equal voice in the international 
order are equivalent to overcoming the 
poverty of its people and gaining them an 
equal voice. Such demands do not really 
require the conscious intervention of the 
masses of a national population, who figure, 
in their demonstrated poverty, as justifica-
tions for the demands of their governments, 
as performers of economic roles, and as 
eventual recipients of the benefits supposed 
to flow from the new order. 
The appeals for 'integral development' 
or 'another development' within countries 
raise problems of a quite different nature, 
that governments are hardly in a position to 
tackle, and that even the non-official intel-
lectuals offering themselves as spokesmen 
for the Third World commonly evade when 
they seek consensus in declarations.3 The 
3 T h e alternative terms emphasize different aspects 
ü f a common aspiration. 'Another development' , intro-
duced by the 1975 Dag Hammarskjõld Report, implies 
posing of equality and elimination of poverty 
as objectives of development is not new, but 
the linking of these objectives with autono-
mous participation by the masses in the 
making and carrying out of developmental 
decisions, with the curbing of superfluous 
consumption and husbanding of the human 
environmental patrimony for future genera-
tions, and with the transformation of societal 
values makes up a formidable agenda. 
The indispensable precondition for 
'another development', in fact, is a world-
wide conversion or change of heart, in-
volving all the social forces that have a share 
of power along with the groups hitherto 
voiceless. The prizes for which classes and 
interest-groups have contended since the 
down of the capitalist order then become 
almost irrelevant. The mass of consumers 
in the rich countries and the rich in the 
poor countries must learn to live austere-
ly. Political leaders, entrepreneurs, sci-
entific-technological innovators, and the 
military must renounce the struggle for 
power and prestige in favour of co-operation 
and fostering of popular initiative. The 
centralized State with its bureaucratic and 
coercive mechanisms must give way to 
direct democracy and self-management at 
the level of the community and the enter-
prise. The groups controlling the transnatio-
nal corporations must set them objectives of 
job creation and production of goods meet-
ing basic human needs rather than max-
imization of profits. The impoverished 
masses must moderate their demands to 
what the national variant of 'another devel-
opment' can afford. The declarations insist 
that the first steps in this direction must be 
taken immediately; human needs cannot 
wait. Their prescriptions for the future are in 
that what is wanted is something quite different from 
previous concepts of development, not only in welfare 
priorities but also in an open-ended experimental 
pursuit of equality, creativity, and self-reliance. 'Inte-
gral development ' , 'unified development ' , and similar 
terms that came into vogue toward the end of the 1960s 
convey the supposition that the pursuit can be planned 
and subjected to universalist norms. 
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all-or-nothing terms; humanity is either to 
be saved or to be damned in its totality.4 
Sometimes the declarations refer to the 
need for 'political will' and try to frighten the 
nationally and internationally dominant 
forces with warnings of catastrophe if they 
do not change their ways. Sometimes they 
shrink the enormous problems of planning 
for societal transformation into problems of 
devising correct methodologies and indica-
tors of progress —problems whose solution 
can be entrusted to international experts and 
research projects. Even the declarations that 
try hardest to come to grips with the 
problems of power, values and national 
diversity— notably the 1975 Dag Ham-
marskjold Report —continually fall back on 
the passive voice in their recommendations 
through inability to identify a societal deus 
ex machina who might convert aspirations 
into action. 
In fact, the proposals combining norms 
for economic equality between countries 
with norms for 'integral development' or 
'another development' have the earmarks of 
concrete utopias devised by committees. 
They are concrete in their aspiration to 
construct blueprints of an attainable future. 
They are Utopian in the immediatism and 
universalism of their formulations. Their 
origin in committees and forums that inten-
tionally bring together representatives of 
different regions, different disciplines and 
different ideologies bars them from any seri-
ous effort to subordinate their conclusions 
to a coherent theory of societal change.5 It 
conduces to an over-generous inclusion of 
4According to the Report of the 1975 Special Task 
Force Meet ing of the Club of Rome, for example, the 
complete development of the potentialities ofall men is 
necessary if inequalities are to be smoothed out and if 
the aim is to give everyone the chance of a healthy and 
self-respecting life. Strategies, policies and planning 
procedures for national and global development must 
b e subordinated to these ends. (The italics are the 
present author's.) Taken literally, the first sentence is 
tautological. Taken as a mandate to planners it is 
staggering. 
5
*Tu the search for a scheme of global rationality, 
we are severely handicapped by the lack of an inte-
objectives and prescriptions strongly sup-
ported by some participants and not serious-
ly objectionable to the others and, more 
important, to an evasion of issues on which 
the views of participants or the organisms to 
which they belong are irreconcilably differ-
ent —in particular, whether 'another devel-
opment' is to come about by the conversion 
of the mighty or their overthrow, and 
whether the basic supposition of 'economic 
development', that increases in production 
of goods can and must outpace population 
growth throughout the foreseeable future, 
remains valid. 
Under these constraints, the new pro-
posals become attempts to devise a con-
vincing new myth without altogether alien-
ating the governmental devotees of the 
waning myth, at a time when the require-
ments for conviction and consensus are 
much more complex than the simple faith of 
the 1950s that correct economic policies will 
eventually enable all peoples to achieve 
the level of consumption of the industrial-
ized countries.6 
While the appeals for 'another develop-
ment' now enter to a surprising degree into 
grative theory—or of rival integrative theories—which 
would b e accepted by wide sections of the intelligentsia 
and the centres of power, and which would explain the 
more significant aspects of the behaviour of society, 
provide a minimum capacity to predict, and afford a 
reliable basis for the formulation of rules and the 
development of institutions. The erosion, or disintegra-
tion, of the major paradigms which had been used to 
elucidate as well as guide national development and 
international relations is an important factor in our 
present uncertainties." (Philippe de Seynes, "The 
'Futures ' Debate in the United Nations", CEPAL 
Review, N." 3, First half of 1977, p. 13.) 
' 'Myths, according to the Brazilian economist Celso 
Furtado, are like lamps that illumine the field of 
perception of the social scientist, enabling him to see 
some problems clearly and leaving him in the dark as to 
others, while at the same time they afford him peace of 
mind, since the value judgements he makes are in his 
sight a reflection of objective reality. We are now, 
Furtado later goes on to say, irrefutably aware that the 
peripheral economies will never be developed, in the 
sense of resembling the economies that at present form 
the centre of the capitalist system. But how can it be 
denied that this idea has been of great use in mobilizing 
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inter-governmental declarations and while 
they are presented as demands of the 
dispossessed majority of the world's people 
they are, to a much greater extent than the 
accompanying demands for economic 
equality between nation-States, the brain 
children of circles of intellectuals and 
reformers meeting in differing combinations 
in one forum after another. They lack the 
dynamism of social movements fighting to 
advance the interests of their members and 
the discipline of coherent ideologies or 
theories of social change. In some versions, 
'another development ' serves as a euphe-
mism for 'socialist development ' , while 
evading identification with current socialist 
models and strategies. The immense majori-
ty of the world's poor knows nothing of them 
nor of the international forums that endorse 
them, in spite of the reiterated attribution of 
authorship to these same poor. The world's 
middle classes hear just enough to make 
them uneasy. While significant fractions of 
these middle classes may feel a certain guilt 
and may even harbour a conviction that 
' something must be done' , the self-defensive 
reactions of the bulk of them to the crises that 
affect them directly indicate the unlikeli-
hood of their voluntarily making sacrifices 
of the magnitude called for by 'another 
development ' . The world's rich and power-
ful keep their own counsel, or manoeuvre to 
make the proposals innocuous by embracing 
them. 
the peoples of the periphery and inducing them to 
accept enormous sacrifices, in legitimating the destruc-
tion of archaic cultural patterns, in explaining and 
making men understand that it is necessary to destroy 
the physical environment, in justifying forms of 
dependence that strengthen the predatory character of 
the production system? It may be asserted, therefore, 
that the idea of economic development is nothing but a 
myth. Thanks to this, it has been possible to divert 
attention from the essential task of identifying the basic 
needs of the collectivity and the possibilities opened up 
for man by the progress of science, in order to 
concentrate it upon abstract objectives such as invest-
ment, exports and growth. (See Celso Furtado, El 
Desarrollo Económico: Un Mito, Mexico, D.F., Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 1975, pp. 13-14 and 90-91.) 
When one examines the writings since 
the 1960s of the participants in the present 
elaboration of prescriptions for 'another 
development ' , one finds that the criticisms 
that can be levelled at their collective 
declarations have been made by many of 
them as individuals, naturally with differing 
emphases and from different theoretical 
approaches. The international and national 
relationships of domination and exploita-
tion, the gap between pretensions and 
performance in international co-operation, 
the inhibitions on decision-making at 
the national level, the 'soft State', the 
pervasively corrupt State, bureaucratic 
inertia, the delusions of technocratic plan-
ning, the distortions of formal education, the 
forces making for mystification and ambigu-
ity in policies are in full view. 
In other words, their diagnoses show: (i) 
a low degree of governmental rationality and 
capacity to plan confronting complex and 
continually changing challenges; (ii) ad-
herence by the dominant forces in most 
national societies to elitist values, implying 
the enjoyment of privileges precisely be-
cause they are privileges outside the reach of 
the majority, and satisfaction with 'nature's 
plan, that they shall take who have the 
power, and they shall keep who can'; fiii) 
susceptibility among the masses to mobiliza-
tion and united effort in support of tradition-
al parochial causes —national prestige, 
territorial aggrandizement, religious and 
ethnic quarrels. Within each nation-State, 
large or small, simple or complex in its social 
and economic structures, political contests 
are under way for a bewilderingly varied 
assortment of prizes that absorb the partici-
pants to the practical exclusion of the great 
question posed by 'another development*: 
that of human survival on terms making 
survival humanly meaningful. 
Such diagnoses have left some of their 
authors profoundly pessimistic concerning 
the possibility of future realization of their 
own democratic and humanitarian values. 
Others, on the basis of their evaluations of 
present power structures and the character-
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istics of the classes benefiting from or 
exploited under them, opt reluctantly for 
essentially reformist approaches requiring 
enl ightenment of the national élites and the 
dominant forces in the world centres, and 
assignation of leadership to strong States 
conceivably capable of representing the 
long-term interests of the national society. 
Still others conclude that a revolutionary 
democratization of societies throughout the 
world accompanying a transformation of 
values and of human nature itself must be 
possible because it is necessary, Still others 
tiy to construct workable blueprints for the 
transformation of their own societies and to 
demonstrate the non-viability of other paths 
to the future, eschewing universalism and 
relying on the force of rational demonstra-
tion to recommend the blueprints to national 
élites or political forces able to take power 
and apply them. 
Even the more optimistic explorers 
seem from time to time to be floundering in a 
bog as they try to move from the multiform 
absurdit ies and injustices of present human 
relationships and public actions to some firm 
path leading to national and international 
orders capable of giving priority to satisfac-
tion of the basic needs of all human beings. 
Overt rejection of this priority has been 
muted to a degree that would have been 
unthinkable a few decades ago. The prolifer-
ation of declarations and 'plans of action' 
demonstrates a consensus of respectable 
opinion: the world order is in crisis and must 
be transformed. But this consensus has the 
yieldingness of the bog rather than the 
firmness of a path supporting a vigorous 
advance in any one direction. 
Economists have retained the central 
role in shaping the more recent proposals for 
'another development ' , as well as the pro-
posals for a new international economic 
order, which they (or other economists) held 
in elaborating the earlier myth of economic 
development . Certain economists have, in 
fact, taken the lead in the chorus of criticisms 
of the narrowness of the economic vision 
focussed on accumulation and investment 
for acceleration of growth in production; in 
some cases, abjuring their own earlier 
prescriptions. One of them sets forth the 
reasons for their continuing central position 
as follows: 
"In line with traditions that are now more 
than two centuries old, we economists 
have this slightly paranoid but socially 
useful bent of mind; we naturally accept 
the responsibility for taking a broad 
view of a whole country, and indeed of 
the whole world, and for thinking in 
dynamic terms of national and inter-
national policies. Place any economist 
in the capital city of an underdeveloped 
country and give him the necessary 
assistance and he will in no time make a 
plan. In this regard we are unique 
among the social scientists. No so-
ciologist, psychologist or anthropologist 
would ever think of trying to do such a 
thing."7 
This predisposition of economists meets 
the need of governments, international 
organizations and sectors of public opinion 
that have become sensitized to world crises 
to believe in the possibility of plannable, 
harmonious, universally applicable solu-
tions. If the previous prescriptions for de-
velopment have not worked satisfactorily, 
new and 'more comprehensive' prescrip-
tions must be needed. 
Since the early stages of diagnoses and 
planning for 'economic development' , the 
dominant economists have invited the 
participation of other social scientists and 
specialists in social policies, but naturally on 
their own terms. The latter are now closer to 
the centre of developmental thinking than 
before, since the more innovative econo-
mists as well as political leaders have 
convinced themselves that the difficulties in 
the way of 'another development ' are not 
primarily economic. Sociologists, anthropol-
7Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty: 
A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline, Har-
mondsworth, Middlesex, Allen Lane, The Penguin 
Press, 1970; and New York, Random House, Pantheon 
Books, 1970, p. 37. 
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ogists, political scientists and psychologists, 
however, cannot be much more at home in 
their new responsibilities than in the previ-
ous role assigned to them by economists of 
diagnosing and prescribing for 'social obsta-
cles ' to 'economic development' . 'Moderni-
zation', the main general concept advanced 
by a good many of these other social 
scientists to complement 'economic devel-
opment ' , has turned out to be as elusive and 
ambiguous in relation to human welfare as 
development itself. 'Another development' 
calls for 'another modernization'. Social 
science theories that look to class conflict as 
the motor of societal change are still less 
assimilable to the demand for comprehen-
sive plans governed by the norms of'another 
development ' . Whether the observer's atten-
tion centres on the international order, 
national political structures, classes, inter-
est-groups, communities, families, or indi-
viduals whose responses are conditioned by 
these wider circles, he sees changes under 
way which will undoubtedly incorporate 
iniluences from the campaigns for egalitari-
an, basic needs-oriented and environment-
oriented styles of development and which 
will influence these campaigns in return, but 
which are not susceptible to planning by any 
identifiable agents. The demand for social 
and political prescriptions for the manage-
ment of these changes leads back to contra-
dictions in which development policies up 
to the present have recurrently been entan-
gled whenever they have ventured beyond a 
narrowly economic focus: standardized 
spontaneity, popular initiative channelled 
towards targets imposed from above, co-
operative action expected between groups 
with conflicts of interests that their members 
perceive. 
Social scientists in the Third World are 
somewhat more disposed than their counter-
parts in the 'central' countries to view the 
State as a coherent entity rather than an 
aggregation of bureaucracies and interest-
groups, but they are even less inclined to 
attribute to the States now on the stage the 
degree of autonomy and benevolence need-
ed if they are to lead the way to another 
development' .8 In most cases, the State, 
whatever aspirations its technobureaucracy 
might harbour, would be the agent of forces 
incompatible with any systematic move in 
such a direction. 
Assignment to the State of the task of 
constructing 'another development' (or, in 
another current formulation, 'exercising the 
right to choose a national style of develop-
ment ' ) thus in the real world may not bring 
about much more than an array of Potemkin 
villages masking the pursuit of group inter-
ests by the forces dominating the State. The 
greater the apparent autonomy of the State 
apparatus, the greater the opportunities for 
counterfeiting of achievements, conceal-
ment of failures, and proliferation of corrupt 
practices and special privileges among the 
'servants' of the State. 
Nor are the prospects much more prom-
ising for a withering away of the State 
through the accession to power of a social 
class destined to do away with exploitation, 
or through the generalized enlightenment of 
the population up to the point of achieving 
ability to manage its own affairs co-opera-
tively and non-bureaucratically, through 
direct democracy. The present boom in 
construction of concrete utopias, in fact, has 
followed a fading of the faith that flourished 
in important proportions of different social 
classes in the industrialized countries from 
8 In a 1972 conference of Latin American and 
United States social scientists it is striking that the 
former generally attribute coherent purposes to the 
State, whether as 'the executive committee of the 
capitalist class' or as a semi-autonomous actor, while the 
latter see 'bureaucratic policy-making', in which com-
ponents of the State apparatus can, up to a point, pursue 
different objectives in alliance with different interest-
groups in the society (e.g., the 'military-industrial 
complex' and sectoral government agencies linked to 
organized labour, organized farmers, etc.), with an 
approach to unity to be expected only in the presence of 
a menace perceived as extraordinarily threatening to 
the interests of the whole society. See Julio Cotler and 
Richard R. Fagen, Ed., Latin America and the United 
States: The Changing Political Realities, Stanford 
University Press, 1974. Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
has diagnosed the Brazilian State in terms rather-similar 
to the second view, in Autoritarismo e Democratização, 
Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, especially p. 182. 
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the nineteenth century up to the 1940s: the 
faith that the Good Society would be 
achieved shortly after the coming to power of 
the proletariat or of a democratic-socialist 
intellectual élite. During the 1950s various 
observers of social change evaluated this 
fading away optimistically in terms of the 
'end of ideology' and the clearing of the way 
for consensus on practical and incremental 
reforms. At present, even in the national 
societies in which material conditions, polit-
ical culture, and discontent with the capital-
ist-consumerist style of development might 
seem most propitious, one now finds a 
predominant sense of the complexity and 
ambiguity of progress, in which each 
achievement brings new problems without 
fully overcoming the old ones, in which all 
the conceivable paths to a better future are 
round-about, with the pitfalls along the way 
easier to foresee than the happy ending. 
There seems to be no plausible alterna-
tive to the conclusion that initiatives for 
deliberate modification of styles of develop-
ment will have to continue to struggle 
through the bog of cross-purposes, ritual 
activities, evasions, and resistances, even if 
the preconditions for societal transformation 
become as favourable as can realistically be 
hoped for. Nor is it likely that whatever 
transformations occur will bring national 
societies any closer to uniformity, for better 
or worse. Some national societies may 
enhance their strength within the world 
order without enhancing the well-being of 
their members; others may do both; still 
others, unfortunately, may do neither. Some 
classes and groups within countries will lose 
present advantages, will be forced to change 
their ways of livelihood, will be left in or 
reduced to poverty whether or not the 
majority gains and whether or not the overall 
trend is toward equality. There can be no 
guarantee to any of the societal actors that 
their struggles and sacrifices will have 
results that can be defined in advance. In 
spite of the internationalization of 'plans of 
action', the transformation will continue to 
take place within the boundaries of nation-
States and States whose dominant forces are 
trying to make them into nations. In each 
State, the interplay of ideologies, strategies, 
power relationships, pressures and conflicts 
only tenuously related to 'development' will 
point to different possible outcomes. One of 
the most striking contradictions of the 
present situation is the discrediting of the 
nation-State as incapable of coping with the 
challenges it faces; and at the same time the 
renewed insistence on self-reliance and the 
right of the nation-State to choose its style of 
development free of external pressures; 
together with the continued proliferation of 
new States whose capacity for self-determi-
nation is much more questionable than that 
of the States whose leaders are convinced 
that integration in larger units is the only 
viable option. 
Such explorations of the future as the 
two reports to the Club of Rome9 insist that 
piecemeal, intuitive, or common-sense tac-
tics to cope with the crises of the future will 
be worse than ineffective; they will contrib-
ute to the disasters they are supposed to 
ward oft. If this is correct and if one can see 
no prospect for responses that are other than 
piecemeal and mutually contradictory, what 
then? Are the concrete utopias devised by 
committees with their universalism and 
immediatism, their hospitality to all kinds of 
worthy causes, anything more than another 
ritual recognition that the situation is des-
perate? 
One might vary the exhortation common 
to these utopias, to the effect that 'humanity 
must choose' between paths leading to 
survival and destruction, and urge their 
intellectual fathers to choose between the 
different conceptions of the human future 
that are now combined in their declarations. 
Do they envisage that a correct combination 
yD. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and 
W. W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth: A report for 
the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of 
Mankind, New York, Universe Books, 1972; and 
Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the 
Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome, 
New York, Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974. 
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of 'practical', 'concrete' reforms negotiable 
be tween present governments can set hu-
manity on the path to what they mean by 
'development '? Do they aim at images of the 
future that can inspire and mobilize social 
forces for a transformation very different 
from the optimal results of reforms that are 
now negotiable? 
The mixture of propositions based on 
different theories and aimed at different 
publics weakens the convincingness of the 
declarations both as negotiable packages of 
demands and as mobilizing myths. While 
individuals and political movements refer-
ring their actions back to a coherent theory 
can choose, however, it is of the essence of 
the debate over future international and 
national orders that the participants must fall 
back on formulas affirming that humanity 
can have its cake and eat it, that equality for 
nation-States within a world order requiring 
economic growth dynamized by manipu-
lated consumption demands and armaments 
expenditures can be reconciled with equali-
ty for human being within societies requir-
ing radically different incentives and human 
relationships. 
T h e international declarations and 
plans of action, in fact, reflect a real 
hybridization of policies, deriving from 
different conceptions of human needs and 
different conceptions of the economic King-
dom of Necessity, that is shaping the 
evolution of national societies and the 
international order itself. In the national 
societies most wedded to the necessity of 
rapid economic growth governed by the 
market, one finds the dynamism of this 
process increasingly entangled with elabo-
rate and costly public services and regula-
tions stemming from egalitarian, welfare and 
environmental preoccupations and from the 
power of interest groups disposed to tolerate 
the functioning of the system only to the 
extent that it incorporates their demands. In 
the United States as well as Europe these 
preoccupations and pressures are changing 
the functioning of the societies in ways that 
would have been inconceivable a few years 
ago, without, however, displacing the pri-
vate stimulation of consumption and the 
public allocations of resources supposed to 
maintain the previous dynamism. 
At the same time, the increasing num-
bers of national societies whose dominant 
forces strive or pretend to strive for socialist-
egalitarian styles of development with com-
pletely different sources of dynamism re-
main enthralled by growth for the sake of 
growth —or for the sake of national power— 
and are continually tempted or pressed to 
the reintroduction of market mechanisms, 
consumerist incentives, and privileged life-
styles for the higher bureaucratic and mili-
tary élites. 
At the international level the hybridiza-
tion of policies deriving from the two 
conceptions of development generates fur-
ther contradictions, or at least a juxtaposition 
of objectives incompatible without a com-
prehensive rationality and global planning 
capacity that are not in sight. The one 
approach requires that the 'rich' countries 
continue to expand their purchases of raw 
materials from the 'poor' countries, at high 
and stable prices, and welcome imports of 
manufactures. The other approach requires 
that the 'rich' countries use raw materials 
more sparingly and leave a larger share for 
direct meeting of the needs of the 'poor' 
countries; the latter should also expand their 
manufactures primarily to meet basic needs 
of their own people. 
The one approach implies that the poor 
countries and the rich should become even 
more interdependent. The other implies 
that countries in both groups should become 
m,ore self-reliant and views the resulting 
constriction of certain lines of economic 
growth as a gain rather than a disaster.10 The 
' "See Lucio Geller, "Notas sobre Delinking y 
Relinking", Seminario-Foro del Tercer Mundo sobre 
Auto-Apoyo Colectivo, Limn, February 1976, for a 
relevant observation to the following effect: Everything 
that contributes to a break-up ot the imperialist style of 
integration will point the way to self-reliance on the part 
of peripheral and central countries alike. It is needless 
to stress that sell-reliance is not self-sufficiency; but it 
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one approach implies that tourists should 
visit the poor countries in large numbers and 
spend freely. The other implies that visitors 
should live austerely and place their skills at 
the service of the people they visit. Under 
the one approach, the transnational enter-
prises, properly watched and regulated but 
retaining their present profit incentives, are 
an indispensable instrument of develop-
ment. Under the other, the transnational s 
can be tolerated only on condition of a 
transformation of their incentives and their 
functioning that would practically convert 
them into philanthropic foundations. 
The centre-periphery relationships of 
dominance and dependency and the nation-
al styles of development or underdevelop-
ment deriving from them have revealed too 
many anomalies and dangers to be able to 
mobilize the indispensable minimum of 
consensus, but the alternatives must contin-
ue to contend with the powerful momen-
tum of what has been done and with their 
own conceptual and practical weaknesses. 
The central countries may well reduce their 
rates of economic growth over the long term 
as the Bariloche Foundation's Latin Ameri-
can World Model, along with other guides to 
the future, demands, not because of altruism, 
but partly because of ecological constraints, 
partly because of inability to find adequate 
substitutes for sources of economic dynam-
ism —armaments and the automobile— that 
for one reason or another have to be curbed, 
and partly because of growing dissension 
over life styles and national objectives. 
It is unlikely that under such conditions 
their dominant forces, trying to cope with 
is not superfluous to note that the break-up to which we 
allude may result in some reduction of international 
trade between central and peripheral countries. Such a 
reduction will be highly advantageous in the long run if 
it is reflected in a contraction of exports from peripheral 
countries which sustain a consumer-society model in 
the central countries, and in a contraction of exports 
from central countries that consist of inputs and capital 
goods to sustain in peripheral countries an industrial 
structure at the service of minority interests. 
severe internal tensions, could or would pay 
much attention to the corollary demand that 
they compensate the Third World for past 
exploitation. Even if lower growth rates 
derive from harmonious changes in values, 
from popular preferences to work less and 
live more simply, the producers would 
hardly go on striving to produce goods to 
benefit the rest of the world, and they might 
learn to do without many non-essential 
goods they now buy from the Third World. 
An end to the armaments race, by itself, 
would render obsolete the oft-repeated 
projections demonstrating the central coun-
tries' dependence on imports of minerals 
from the Third World. The dominant forces 
in the central countries are already begin-
ning to take up the arguments for Third 
World self-reliance as a defence against the 
claims made on them by the advocates of a 
New International Economic Order. 
Behind the present proliferation of 
utopias devised by committees lurks a 
recurrent fear: however irrational and unjust 
the combinations of carrots and sticks by 
which the modern capitalist and socialist 
economic systems have kept human beings 
innovating, producing, and squabbling over 
distribution, do not the alternatives all lead 
to bureaucratic compulsion and eventual 
stagnation? 
From the point of view of the present 
exploration, the values and suppositions 
underlying the demand for 'another devel-
opment' are to be preferred to those underly-
ing the demand for economic equality 
between nation-States. It does not follow 
that 'another development' will emerge 
harmoniously and predictably once the men 
of good will in the international forums hit 
upon the correct combination of planning 
and exhortation. The following passages 
translated from a recent essay by Alain 
Touraine point to the path to be followed in 
the next stage of this exploration: 
"...A study conducted in terms of crisis 
leads up to recourse to a rescue plan for 
the planet envisaged as a vast social 
system, at the core of which a central 
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authority, or, more simply, a coherent 
will, could propose reasonable solu-
tions, beneficial, that is, for mankind as a 
whole, and at the same time technically 
feasible. When people shout 'Fire!', it 
means that they expect the firemen to 
come ... Conversely, to speak of muta-
tion brings to the fore cultural changes 
and changes in social relations, particu-
larly power relations; and this is mean-
ingful only within real social systems, 
i.e., systems defined by institutions and 
powers. 
"...The time has come to leave behind 
these interpretations of current change 
in terms of crisis. For if we were merely 
living through a crisis, the sole solution 
would be the emergence of an integrat-
ing force from the collectivity that the 
crisis is affecting ....Which could only 
lead —and this is the principal ideolo-
gical function of the concept of crisis 
today— to the strengthening of a new 
ruling élite, acting at once on behalf of 
rationality and in defence of the entire 
collectivity. It may be thought that this 
is how things should be; or, on the 
contrary, a different style of change may 
be desired. 
"But the first essential is to recognize 
that the idea of crisis forms part of the 
ideology of power: it implies a reorga-
nization of society at the top ... To speak 
of crisis is to adopt the standpoint of 
power; to speak of mutation implies 
studying the formation of a new cultural 
field, of new social relations and new 
social conflicts, which direct attention 
as much towards the appearance of new 
popular movements as towards the 
emergence of new forms of power."11 
Let us then look at the mutations or 
'seeds of change' that can be detected in 
different kinds of 'central' and 'peripheral' 
national societies today, supposing that the 
firemen of a new international order are not 
about to arrive to resolve a crisis, but that the 
examination of seeds of change may tell us 
something about the prospects for a future 
susceptible to modification by movements 
oriented by the egalitarian and humanitarian 
values inspiring 'another development'. 
II 
Seeds of change in different types of 
national societies 
1. Hypotheses 
This section ofthe present paper will consist 
of an annotated listing of phenomena now 
visible in different types of national societies 
that throw light on future prospects for the 
international order and for 'another develop-
ment'. The listing does not pretend to 
comprehensiveness. Its main purpose is to 
demonstrate the diversity and apparent 
indeterminateness of present trends and the 
inadequacy of current stereotypes concern-
ing the roles and the potential responsive-
ness to utopian-normative prescriptions of 
the different types of societies.12 The phe-
nomena are labelled 'seeds of change' to 
suggest that their present visibility need not 
correspond to their future importance. Not 
all the 'seeds' will germinate and some of 
n S e e Alain Touraine, "Crise ou mutation?", in Au-
delà de la crise, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976, pp. 
24-25 and 53. 
12This section aspires to complement without 
duplicating the profound analysis carried out by José 
Medina Echavarria in three recent papers: "Latin 
America in the possible scenarios of détente", CEPAL 
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them will grow into feeble or purely orna-
mental plants. Intellectual fashions, person-
al values and preferences inevitably in-
fluence judgements concerning the future 
prospects of the 'seeds'. The listing unavoid-
ably leaves out of account the historical 
dimension of the seeds of change and the 
influence on their potency of long-standing 
national projects or aspirations. The general 
hypotheses informing the presentation, al-
ready suggested in the previous section, are 
the following: 
(a) The two dichotomies that have gov-
erned international discourse on 'develop-
ment' —(i) between 'developed' (central, 
industrialized, rich, imperialist) countries 
and 'developing' (peripheral, poor, depen-
dent, exploited, non-industrialized) coun-
tries; (ii) between 'capitalist' (market econo-
my) and 'socialist' (centrally planned) coun-
tries— never entirely satisfactory simplifica-
tions of reality, are becoming more inade-
quate, not because of a generalized 'con-
vergence' between countries on the two 
sides of either dichotomy, but because of the 
emergence of an increasing number of 
intermediate, anomalous patterns. A few of 
the 'developing' countries have become 
wealthier than the developed according to 
the conventional indicator of GNP per 
capita. Others have become highly indus-
trialized and more wedded to the unrestrict-
ed operation of market forces than are most 
of the 'developed' countries today. At the 
same time, traits are coming to the fore in the 
'developed' countries that are incongruous 
with previously accepted images of 'market 
economy' or 'centrally planned economy', 
including traits previously singled out by the 
spokesmen of the developed world as char-
acteristic of 'under-development'. 
(b) In the different groups of countries 
—whether classified by region, income 
Review, N.° 2, Second Half of 1976; "Notes on the 
future of the western democracies", CEPAL Review, 
N.° 4, Second Half of 1977; and "Las propuestas de un 
nuevo orden económico internacional en perspectiva", 
Revista Paraguaya de Sociología, N.° 38, January-
April 1977. 
level, political system, or otherwise— inter-
nal social, cultural and political changes are 
interacting with the more strictly 'economic' 
processes and policies (in production, tech-
nology, marketing, finance, etc.) and with 
foreign policy tactics in pursuit of govern-
mental views of national interests. The for-
mer changes seem to be exceedingly self-
contradictory and ambiguous ; no clear domi-
nant trend,is visible. The internal changes-
characteristic of each group of countries 
react on the internal changes of the rest 
through imposition, borrowing and deliber-
ate rejection, further complicating the nation-
al patterns. They impose constraints on the 
capacity of governments in all types of na-
tional societies to adopt and apply coherent 
policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
(c) The proliferating discussion of norms 
for a new international economic order and 
for ideal styles of development at the 
national level coincides with a dearth of 
intellectually compelling theories of social 
change, of dynamic political leadership, and 
of wide popular support for any one develop-
ment strategy. This applies to practically all 
countries at present, whatever their income 
level, their political-economic system, or 
their dominant ideology. It is a moot ques-
tion whether the shortcomings of leadership 
should be attributed to the nature of present 
challenges and the erosion of confidence in 
the conventional wisdom on development 
and modernization, or vice versa. In any 
case, the continuing elaboration of all-
inclusive normative declarations and 'plans 
of action' is in part a ritual substitute for real 
capacity to cope with change. Activities of 
this kind can be expected to exert some real 
influence on the directions of change and the 
ways in which men interpret it, but, filtered 
through structures exerting greater resis-
tance to some actions than to others and 
transforming the meaning of certain actions, 
they may well have results as far from the 
intentions of their present sponsors as have 
all the great mobilizing myths of history. 
(d) The guidelines to 'another develop-
ment' vacillate between technobureaucratic 
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solutions —a centrally-planned world socie-
ty corresponding to the image of 'space-
ship earth'— and participationist solutions 
—local self-management, subordination of 
'development' to local cultures and values, 
the withering away of the State— corre-
sponding to Touraine's distinction between 
'crisis' and 'mutation' approaches. A compa-
rable ambiguity can be seen in the seeds of 
change that are going to be discussed. For 
better or for worse, a continuing tension 
between the two approaches to the organiza-
tion of society seems more probable than the 
triumph of a technobureaucratic utopia or a 
participationist utopia. 
(e) In such a listing of the seeds of 
change it may be permissible although not 
entirely satisfactory to leave in the back-
ground the framework of economic relation-
ships and power politics which has received 
more attention in the debate over new 
international orders than the questions to be 
discussed in this section. Most of the 
problems and changes in attitudes to be 
discussed have emerged or become more 
pronounced during a long period of econom-
ic growth and national and international 
political patterns which, although conflic-
tive enough, have been stable in comparison 
with the preceding decades of depression 
and world war. Their future relevance 
depends only in part on whether the central 
countries recover high and stable growth 
rates and whether their relations with the 
rest of the world become more co-operative 
or more conflictive. The terms of the listing, 
however, do reflect an expectation that the 
future will be a mixed one, of alternating 
growth generating inflation and recessions 
pushing up unemployment; of conflicts 
subsiding in some areas and springing up in 
others; of concessions by the centre to the 
periphery that the latter will continue to 
identify as too little and too late. The 
governments may well continue to play 
power games not too different from those of 
the past, but with their capacity to mobilize 
internal support for such games dwindling or 
precarious, and their attention continually 
diverted by domestic contradictions. The 
degree and kind of attention that the leaders 
of the central countries can pay to the rest of 
the world may thus encounter narrower 
bounds, whatever the demands emanating 
from the latter and whatever the threats to 
hegemony presented by political changes in 
the periphery. 
(f) The industrialized countries with 
capitalist or mixed economic systems and 
electorally democratic political regimes can 
be divided roughly into several sub-groups: 
the United States, set apart by the size of its 
economy, the world permeation of its life-
style, and the reactions deriving from its 
eroding world hegemony; the large Western 
European States; the smaller Northern and 
Western European States; the industrialized 
Commonwealth countries of North America 
and Oceania; Japan; and the Mediterranean 
'Latin' countries. Similar seeds of change 
can be identified in all these sub-groupings, 
but in widely differing combinations. The 
following discussion will focus on phenom-
ena that are general but particularly char-
acteristic of the United States, and will then 
comment on the other sub-groupings. The 
socialist countries, excluding the more re-
cent non-industrialized Third World re-
cruits, fall into two sub-groups: U.S.S.R. and 
its East European associates, on the one 
hand, and China, on the other. In the Third 
World a grouping by geographical regions 
coincides in the main with other relevant 
traits, although not with the increasingly 
important but persistently elusive distinc-
tion between national societies whose dom-
inant forces identify them as 'socialist' and 
those whose dominant forces prefer other 
identifications. The discussion will lead to a 
consideration of the implications for Latin 
America, as a region of dependent semi-
development, of its openness to the whole 
range of seeds of change identifiable in the 
rest of the world. 
2. The industrialized "market-economy" 
countries 
(a) Disillusionment with the capacity of the 
REINVENTING DEVELOPMENT! UTOPIAS DEVISED BY COMMITTEES / Marshall Wolfe 19 
welfare State to 'solve problems' and with 
the capacity of political parties to change the 
conduct of the State for the better has been 
on the increase since the 1960s. Resentment 
of high taxes, bureaucratic controls and 
attempts by the State to regulate behaviour 
for social goals generates sporadic political 
backlashes and passive resistance, while the 
occasions for such resentment continue to 
mount under the pressures to be described 
below. Rising incomes and consumption 
over several decades have cushioned social 
conflict but have not left the State in a 
stronger position to set national priorities 
and assign resources once these trends are 
interrupted. It becomes publicly evident 
that a wide range of policies supposedly 
devoted to national defence or human 
welfare have really become governed by 
objectives of propping up the economic 
system or fortifying the position of public 
functionaries, but that the range of policies 
accessible to the State can neither stop 
inflation nor secure full employment. The 
pursuit of semi-autonomous policies and 
pressure group tactics by military and intel-
ligence establishments, by sectoral bureau-
cracies, and by large corporations in the 
'planning system' (in J. K. Galbraith's term) 
becomes more widely known and resent-
ed.13 Continual exposures through the mass 
media of corruption and illegal manipula-
tions reinforce other sources of distrust of the 
State and politicians. 
(b) Warnings of many kinds that pre-
vious patterns of growth in incomes and 
consumption will not be viable in the future, 
supported by visible disbenefits of these 
1 3 For example, the dominance of the ' p ' a n m n > í 
system' of large corporations in the United States over 
the 'market system' in the rest of the economy, the 
symbiosis of this private planning system with the 
public bureaucracy, and the relative impoverishment 
and exploitation of the rest of the society, as interpreted 
by Galbraith, have much in common with the inter-
pretations of dualistic or structurally heterogeneous 
development in Latin America. See John Kenneth 
Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, Boston, 
Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1973. 
patterns, intensify public insecurity. The 
most influential of these warnings up to the 
present have referred to ecological and 
demographic limits to growth. These warn-
ings have been accompanied by prescrip-
tions that suppose a high level of State 
capacity to plan and of public capacity to 
change life-styles through some combination 
of mass conversion and technocratic regula-
tion. However, these very capacities have 
quickly come under question in diagnoses of 
the social and political limits to growth. The 
latter diagnoses, while their direct influence 
is relatively restricted, give intellectual 
justification for the popular distrust of the 
welfare State.14 
(c) Middle- and working-class life-styles 
and consumption goals begin to change, 
although the standards of the high-produc-
tion, high-consumption society remain pre-
dominant. The unforeseen consequences of 
mass access to what have recently been 
labelled 'positional goods' generate simul-
taneous disillusionment with these goods 
and more frantic striving for incomes guaran-
teeing access to goods still conferring special 
advantages.15 The influence of the 'work 
14
"... the most significant limits to growth ... are 
limits set by the already overstrained capacity of'human 
beings to conceive, design, manage, support and adapt 
to extremely complex systems of human interdepen-
dence . In short, it is the political limits that are likely 
to constrain the continuity of physical growth well 
ahead of all other factors." (Ruf'us E. Miles, Jr., 
Awakening from the American Dream: The Social and 
Political Limits to Growth, New York, Universe Books, 
1976, p . 2.) "The core of the problem is that the market 
provides a full range of choice between alternative 
piecemeal, discrete, marginal adjustments, but no 
facility for choice between alternative States... . By 
contrast, the political mechanism, through which pref-
erences between alternative States could in principle 
be posed, has not yet developed a satisfactory system for 
such decision. . . . Consequently, the capacity of both the 
market and the political system to meet expectations 
tends to be overestimated. They cannot deliver on what 
the public takes to be their promise." {Fred Hirsch, 
Social Limits to Growth: A Twentieth Century Fund 
Study, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1976, p . 18.) 
15
'Positional goods' are goods whose utility to the 
individual is negatively affected by increases in the 
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ethic ' and the prestige of durable consumer 
goods begin to decline. Leisure, vacation 
travel, sexual contacts, and a wide range of 
'do-it-yourself activities become more high-
ly valued and socially acceptable. Alterna-
tive life-styles, some of them approximating 
to the ideals of 'another development', take 
shape among minorities; an apparent widen-
ing of the range of choice contradicts the 
bureaucratization of the societies. Publica-
tions that, in many variants, predict doom for 
consumerism, argue for alternatives, and 
offer guidelines, reach a broad public. At the 
same time, in certain medium-sized high-
income countries in which the welfare State 
has reached its closest approximation to 
satisfaction of material needs and provision 
of abundant leisure to the whole population, 
the apathetic response of the majority to the 
apparent opportunities for creative life-
styles troubles social scientists and political 
ideologists. 
(d) Aggressively egalitarian and libertar-
ian movements emerge among racial and 
linguistic minorities, women, youth, homo-
sexuals, etc. The movements in question, 
particularly among the youth, either have a 
cyclical character, rising and falling rapidly 
in followings and militancy, or undergo 
continual metamorphoses in demands and 
tactics. The manner in which the mass 
communication media disseminate infor-
mation on them and emphasize their more 
extreme or picturesque features exacerbates 
these latter traits. Descriptions and interpre-
tations quickly become dated, as in the case 
of the identification by some social scientists 
in the late 1960s of a profound revolution in 
the values and behaviour of the educated 
youth; the ferment of youth subsided by the 
early 1970s, but now may be on the rise 
again. The movements in question affect the 
functioning of society and the State in 
several quite different ways: 
number ot persons having access to them (e.g., 
automobiles, suburban homes, higher education). See 
Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 
(i) They exert pressure on the State to 
guarantee rights and offset social or 
biological handicaps by regulations and 
compensatory services, as in the cases of 
'affirmative action' to guarantee women 
and minorities parity in employment 
and education. These measures place 
unprecedented responsibilities on the 
welfare State and introduce serious 
rigidities into the functioning of public 
services and private enterprises; 
(ii) Some of them resort readily to extra-
legal tactics such as disruption of essen-
tial services, boycotts and tax strikes that 
hamper the functioning of the State and 
contribute to its discredit as either 
impotent or repressive. 
(iii) They generate a wide range of 
initiatives for personal or group seces-
sion from the prevailing life-style and 
the political and economic systems; 
(iv) The clash in life-styles, the cultural 
shock caused by certain libertarian 
demands, and the frictions produced by 
bureaucratic regulation of group rights 
excite organized resistance, counter-
mobilization, and extra-legal disruption 
by other elements of the societies, 
including the police. 
(e) The traditional political roles of the 
middle and working classes shift to some 
extent. The more highly educated and 
upper-income elements of the middle clas-
ses become more open to new life-styles, 
egalitarian and reformistpolicies, and global 
issues such as environmental protection and 
limits to growth. A large part of the working 
class, particularly the better-off and better-
organized elements, remains culturally con-
servative, becomes less open to the appeals 
of socialist and social reform ideologies, and 
concentrates on particularist demands. The 
impingement on its values of the middle-
class cultural revolution, and the impact on 
its immediate interests of continual techno-
logical innovation, loss of dynamism and 
dwindling employment in traditional heavy 
industries, and internationalization of pro-
duction and labour markets under the aegis 
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of the transnational corporations, place it on 
the defensive. It thus exerts pressure on the 
State to stimulate production along tradition-
al l ines, to restrict imports, and to exclude 
foreign labour.16 It is generally negative 
toward environmental and energy-saving 
regulations that might curtail employment. 
(f) The complexity of the public services 
required by high-consumption, highly 
urbanized, highly mobile societies means 
that a wide variety of specialized occu-
pational groups either negotiating directly 
with the State (police, firemen, postal em-
ployees, teachers, doctors, etc.) or engaged 
in activities so central to the functioning of 
the society that their demands impinge 
necessarily on the State (transport, power 
and communications workers) become able 
to enforce demands by tactics disrupting the 
life-styles and expectations of large sectors 
of the population. Their increasing readi-
ness to resort to such tactics, and the 
decreasing capacity of the State to prevent 
this by legal prohibitions and repression, 
coincides with widespread dissatisfaction 
over the declining quality of the services 
and the inability of the State to run them 
efficiently. 
(g) Mass formal education shares con-
spicuously in the dissillusionment with the 
achievements of the welfare State. The 
apparent capacity of the schools to socialize 
youth and inculcate tool skills declines, in 
spite of increasingly prolonged and costly 
compulsory periods of schooling, during a 
period in which the capacity of the family to 
perform these functions is also declining. 
T h e impression gains ground that the 
1 6Celso Furtado points out that the large corpora-
tions have a choice of two tactics to increase profits, to 
the extent that the State permits their use: exporting 
production to subsidiaries in countries with low labour 
costs and importing labour from the same countries. 
The immediate interest of the organized workers in the 
high-wage countries, except in periods of very rapid 
economic growth and full employment, in which they 
are not interested in jobs in the lower range of skills and 
wages, is to exert pressure on the State to prevent the 
corporations from using either tactic. See Celso Fur-
tado, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
schools are serving a custodial function 
(freeing parents for work and keeping chil-
dren off the streets) more than an education-
al function. The egalitarian objectives 
discussed above force additional responsi-
bilities on the schools while widely publi-
cized research fortifies scepticism as to the 
capacity of the schools to contribute to such 
objectives. At the same time, the 'massifica-
tion' of higher education devalues its role in 
selection for preferred occupations, leads to 
further prolongation at post-graduate levels, 
and contributes to the cycles of youth 
protest. 'Scholarly research' becomes in-
creasingly formalized as a means of employ-
ing and also screening the products of higher 
education. Some of the eligible youth aban-
don education in rejection of these patterns. 
(h) Fertility rates decline with unex-
pected rapidity to levels below replacement, 
with consequent accelerated aging of the 
national populations.17 This has a series of 
repercussions on the societies that will be-
come progressively more important: 
(i) The numbers of young people pass-
ing through the school systems in the 
1960s and then entering the labour mar-
ket in the 1970s have been exceptio-
nally high owing to the so-called 'baby 
boom' of the later 1940s and the 1950s. 
With the present slowdown in economic 
growth their absorption into the labour 
force is lagging. Unemployment rates 
for the active population under 25 years 
of age are much higher than rates for the 
rest of the active population. The more 
highly educated youth have difficulties 
in finding jobs matching their expecta-
tions, and the least educated cannot find 
jobs of any kind. However, the numbers 
In the countries with relatively high fertility rates 
in the recent past, such as the United States, this does 
not preclude the likelihood of a stationary population 
before the end of the century, even if the present trend 
continues. In Germany (the Democratic Republic as 
well as the Federal Republic), however, and in a few 
other European countries in which a recent drop in the 
birth rate follows a relatively long period of low fertility, 
the population is now beginning to decline. 
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entering the school systems have been 
falling for some time, and projections for 
the future are now being revised down-
ward.18 The numbers entering the la-
bour market will also shortly begin to 
fall. Presumably the excess of young 
entrants over demand will dry up and be 
replaced by an excess of demand over 
supply, although the groups that have 
experienced prolonged unemployment 
may continue to present serious prob-
lems of adaptation. Whether the lesser 
numbers of youth will result in labour 
shortages will depend partly on future 
rates of economic growth and styles of 
technological innovation and partly on 
the participation rates of women, immi-
grants, and the upper age groups; 
(ii) The unexpectedly rapid aging of the 
population is already producing impor-
tant shifts in needs for different social 
services, with unused capacity in the 
schools and overburdened services for 
the aged. The importance of geriatric 
medical care rises and that of pediatric 
care declines. The market for consumer 
goods, recreational services and hous-
ing also changes. Within the norms of 
the consumer society, industry and ad-
vertising must aqjust and try to manipu-
late the changes; 
(iii) T h e increase in the relative size of 
the upper age groups and the continual 
amplification of social security benefits 
and coverage over recent years generate 
unexpectedly formidable rises in social 
security costs, bringing abruptly to the 
attention of the societies the ominous 
iHln the United States, projections for total school-
age population (5-24) in the year 2000 have been 
revised downward from 125 million to 79 million, only 
slightly higher than the present figure. The proportion 
of high school students going on to higher education is 
declining, and this, together with the decreases in size 
of the age groups, indicates that higher enrolment may 
be only 13 million in 2000, as against the 17 to 22 million 
once expected. (See "The Future Revised: Education's 
Big Boom is Ending but Studies to Get More Diverse", 
The Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1976.) 
implications of the future burden. This 
trend combines with the broader disil-
lusionment with the welfare State and 
the quest for alternative life-styles to 
encourage rising evasion of labour laws 
and taxes, particularly through self-em-
ployment and artisan-type activities. 
Complex conflicts of interests and aspira-
tions between the population of active 
ages and the upper age groups, or be-
tween sectors of both groups, are 
emerging. With recession the position of 
older workers becomes more insecure; 
.if their jobs disappear they are unlikely 
to find new ones. Some of the aging 
continue to press for early pensioned 
retirement, while others demand the 
abolition of fixed-age retirement and 
legally-guaranteed equal access to jobs, 
because of the frustrations of inactivity 
at reduced income levels. Increased 
employment of the aging will pre-
sumably become necessary to compen-
sate for the decline in young entrants to 
the labour force and relieve the social 
security burden. During the transition 
period, however, this will generate 
other frustrations among the younger 
employed whose prospects for better-
paying jobs and promotions become 
clogged. It will also add to the complexi-
ty of bureaucratic protection of equal 
rights. Even without the re-entry of the 
groups above present retirement ages, 
the average age of the labour force will 
rise, and warnings are now heard that 
this will mean a crippling of innovative-
ness and labour mobility; 
(iv) According to some prognoses, the 
industrialized countries are falling into 
a demographic trap, in which the de-
valuation of the family and the in-
creasing burden of the aged on the 
young will lead to fertility rates perma-
nently below replacement levels and to 
impoverished and decadent national so-
cieties. It seems equally likely, how-
ever, that future fertility rates, with 
universally accessible and acceptable 
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contraception and abortion, will fluctu-
ate abruptly with changing cultural 
fashions, economic conditions, and de-
grees of optimism or pessimism con-
cerning the future, resulting in unpreee-
dentedly uneven age profiles of the 
population. It is also probable that the 
populations of the industrialized coun-
tries will increasingly be replenished, 
whether their dominant forces permit 
this or not, by waves of migrants from 
other parts of the world. For national 
societies adjusting to the ecological, 
political and social limits to growth and 
to the demands for human equality the 
present demographic trends are not nec-
essarily negative, and it is simplistic to 
assume that an aging population must be 
stagnant. However, the trends obvious-
ly call for comprehensive readjustments 
in work patterns, in sources and uses of 
income, and in social interactions, for 
which there is at present no consensus. 
(i) The industrialized countries become 
increasingly dependent on foreign labour to 
perform lower-paid manual work. The char-
acteristics and circumstances of entry of 
such labour differ according to the country 
concerned, but it has become important 
throughout the industrialized world. In 
some countries it is composed mainly of 
migrant workers under contract for fixed 
terms, without families; in others of illegal 
migrants with or without families; in others 
of permanent immigrants mainly with fami-
lies and selected by the host government 
according to some criterion of employabili-
ty; in still others of migrants deriving rights 
of entry from the former colonial status of 
their homeland. T h e migrant workers come 
mainly from 'semi-developed' countries rath-
er than from the 'least-developed' coun-
tries whose excess labour force is physically 
and educationally ill-adapted to the demand. 
The semi-developed countries consequent-
ly face a drain of labour in times of 
prosperity, offset by remittances to families 
from workers abroad, and an intensified 
unemployment problem in times of reces-
sion. (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico, 
and the Caribbean island countries are those 
most affected.) Whatever the circumstances 
of their entry, the migrants gradually gain a 
permanent foothold in the labour force and 
the society of the host country, under 
disadvantageous and sometimes eonflictive 
conditions, and their presence changes the 
outlook and conditions for solidarity of the 
working class. Economic recession and 
rising unemployment make it probable that 
the entry of migrants will be curbed during 
the immediate future, but these factors do 
not altogether offset their willingness to 
accept incomes and working conditions that 
are no longer acceptable to the host country's 
own labor force. 
Two quite different kinds of migrants 
are also contributing to the increasingly 
multi-ethnic character of the populations of 
the industrialized countries: professionals 
and technicians entering the labour force at 
middle or even high income levels, and 
political exiles whose insertion into the 
labour force is often unrelated to their 
previous experience. The numbers and 
national diversity of political exiles have 
increased rapidly, and they are beginning to 
have important catalytic roles both in the 
organization of other migrants and in the 
evolution of political movements in the host 
countries. 
(j) Modernization of agriculture, shifts in 
the structure of industrial production and 
other factors have brought about wide 
variations in rates of economic growth, 
income levels and demands for manpower in 
different internal regions. In the European 
countries here considered, with nearly full 
employment from the late 1940s up to the 
mid-1970s and with slow growth in the 
labour force offset by the importation of 
labour, these disparities have not generated 
unmanageable tensions in the urban zones 
of rapid growth and immigration, but they 
are generating increasingly militant demands 
for autonomy and for a larger share of public 
resources on the part of declining regions 
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and occupations, especially but not exclu-
sively where the regional population is cul-
turally or linguistically distinct from the 
national majority. Questions of the unity of 
the nation-State and the basis for claims to 
self-determination, which seemed to have 
been resolved in Europe, have thus been 
reopened with unexpected violence. 
In the United States the consequences 
of uneven regional growth and changes in 
livelihood have been quite different. Excep-
tionally rapid modernization has expelled 
from agriculture a population with relatively 
low educational and skill levels, and in large 
part hampered by racial discrimination. A 
'marginalized' population in extreme pover-
ty by national norms has thus concentrated 
in the great cities, bringing about a some-
times violent competition for jobs, services 
and housing between the new urbanités and 
the longer-established urban working class; 
the mushrooming of an extremely costly 
public welfare system that unintentionally 
generates disincentives to employment and 
stable family life; and the flight of much of 
the middle-class urban population to the 
suburbs. As the new urbanités become 
increasingly able to compete with other 
urban groups in enforcing demands through 
the vote and through organized action, city 
government enters upon a crisis of contin-
ually rising costs and static resources. The 
simultaneous entry of millions of foreign 
workers, first in agriculture and later in the 
lower-paid urban occupations, places addi-
tional strain on the national capacity for 
adaptation to economic, demographic, and 
cultural change. 
(k) Crime, especially violent crime, in-
creases markedly in quantity and visibility. 
This trend is associated to some extent with 
the urban crisis referred to above, but 
appears also in countries in which this crisis 
is not acute. While speculation on crime 
requires particular caution, in view of temp-
tation to sensationalism and the unrelia-
bility of indicators, it is plausible that the 
rise in visible crime reflects the declining 
legitimacy of the State and the social order 
that also manifests itself in the militant 
libertarian-egalitarian demands and the 
quest for alternative life-styles. The 'respect-
able ' elements of the societies vacillate 
be tween demands for drastic repression and 
demands for broad reforms aimed at the 
social causes of crime, with declining confi-
dence in the effectiveness of any solution. 
There follows resentment against the State 
for inability to cope with the problems; 
increased distrust of ethnic groups associat-
ed with violent crime; and generalized 
refusal on the part ofthe marginalized urban 
population to accept the role of deviants 
from a just social order. Resistance move-
ments and links with political militance 
emerge in the prisons, increasingly over-
crowded and discredited in their rehabilita-
tory and punitive functions. 
(1) Reactions of différents sectors of 
publ ic opinion to trends in the rest of the 
world become increasingly confused, self-
contradictory, guilt-laden, and resentful. 
The concern of parts of the middle classes 
and parts ofthe labour movement over world 
poverty, human rights, population growth, 
environmental and related problems be-
comes stronger, but mingles with rising 
disil lusionment over the efficacy of 'aid' 
(military as well as economic and social); 
resentment over aggressive economic and 
other policies of Third World governments; 
uneasiness concerning the domestic reper-
cussions (particularly the impact on employ-
ment) ofthe activities of transnational corpo-
rations in these countries; and hardening of 
stereotypes concerning the oppressiveness, 
corruption and incompetence of Third 
World governments and dominant classes. 
Small but conspicuous political movements 
identify themselves with Third World revo-
lutionary struggles and even try to reproduce 
these struggles in their own countries. 
Distrust of the motives of the home 
government in supporting and distributing 
'aid' in the face of apparent governmental 
incapacity to solve domestic problems is 
probably most pronounced in the larger 
industrialized countries, particularly in the 
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United States in the aftermath of the Viet-
nam war. In certain middle-sized countries 
in Europe and in certain Commonwealth 
countries the more articulate current of pub-
lic opinion seem to favour the kind of trans-
formation in the Third World that is summed 
up in 'another development ' and to support 
relatively openhanded government co-oper-
ation in such initiatives. In the European 
countries in question this sentiment coin-
cides with the achievement of relatively 
egalitarian welfare-oriented societies under 
democratic socialist governments. Else-
where , particularly in Canada and Australia, 
nationalist reactions against economic, polit-
ical and cultural dominance by the world 
centres have generated a degree of self-
identification with the Third World, with-
out, of course, overcoming the confused, 
suspicious, or censorious attitudes noted 
above. 
(m) Japan, ever since it entered the 
modern world order, has contradicted cur-
rent theories of development and moderni-
zation, constituting an astonishing example 
of what can be achieved by a country with an 
unfavourable resource endowment and a 
social structure very different from that 
associated with capitalist development else-
where . At present, it also constitutes a 
reductio ad absurdum of expectations con-
cerning the benefits of very high economic 
growth rates. Most of the seeds of change 
discussed above are visible, but their specif-
ic traits and their probable consequences 
are far apart from those noted in Europe and 
the United States. 
One sees at present: (i) Apparent prox-
imity to the ecological limits of growth in 
terms of air and water pollution and intensi-
fied overcrowding of population combined 
with mass ownership of durable goods; (ii) 
Exceptionally rapid incorporation of the 
population into a consumer society, with a 
particularly traumatic consumer shift from 
products moderate in space and energy 
demands to the automobile; (ih) Rapid 
increase in resistance by the working class to 
the low wage levels that facilitated export-
oriented economic growth; (iv) Demograph-
ic transition to low fertility accelerating 
through the 1950s, resulting in a present 
labour force nearly stationary in size; (v) In 
consequence of these four trends, an urgent 
need to export further industrial growth to 
countries with more abundant manpower, 
low wage levels, and more incipient pollu-
tion problems (in contrast to Western 
Europe, which has imported workers to take 
the less attractive jobs, Japan is exporting the 
jobs; in the United States the two tactics 
have been followed simultaneously); (vi) A 
boom in mass tourism, mainly to countries 
with lower costs of recreational services (the 
impact of European tourism on the Medi-
terranean and of United States tourism on 
Mexico and the Caribbean has its counter-
part in Japanese tourism in Southeast Asia); 
(vii) Most recently, a sharp decline in the 
rate of growth in production, the appearance 
of appreciable unemployment for the first 
t ime since the early post-war period, and the 
weakening of traditions of job security in 
enterprises. 
The vulnerability of the economy to 
external shocks and the improbability of 
recuperation of growth rates matching those 
of the past are presumably important stimuli 
to anxiety and distrust of the capacity of the 
State to cope; however, these factors are 
offset by a high degree of social discipline 
and by social sources of personal security 
unmatched in the United States or Europe. 
At the same time, violent rejection of the 
existing order by political movements with 
an appreciable following among the youth 
takes particularly extreme forms, and frustra-
tion at the shattering by external and internal 
factors of the dream of permanent full 
employment and consumerist development 
may well exacerbate this tendency. 
(n) In the European Mediterranean 
countries overall trends and patterns differ 
from those of the rest of Europe, in ways that 
are of particular interest to Latin America. 
The countries in this group are Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. France has certain traits 
in common with the group in spite of its 
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higher income level; Yugoslavia in spite of 
its socialist economic and political system; 
and Turkey in spite of its lower income level 
and more predominantly rural population. 
The countries in question are economically 
and socially semi-developed or unevenly. 
developed. Their more backward internal 
regions are suppliers of labour not only to the 
more developed parts of the same countries 
but also to the rest of Europe. Tourism from 
the rest of Europe is an important factor 
in their economic growth and in their social 
changes. Tourism, as in Mexico and the 
Caribbean, demands at the same time con-
siderable investment in modern facilities 
expected by tourists, the preservation of a 
'traditional' culture and artisanal activities, 
and relatively low wage rates in service 
occupations. These countries are undergo-
ing rapid and uneven modernization, with 
more disruptive socio-cultural conse-
quences than in the rest of Europe; differ-
ences between the life-styles of internal 
regions and social classes continue to be 
wide. The demographic transition to low 
rates of population increase is only recently 
completed or is now under way. Politiciza-
tion is relatively intense, with Marxist work-
ing-class parties; neo-Marxist and anarchist 
intellectual currents and youth movements; 
clerical, traditional-reactionary and neo-
Fascist movements; and national-separatist 
movements, all showing greater vigour and 
mass support than elsewhere in the 'devel-
oped' non-Socialist world. The capacity of 
the State to act as arbiter is increasingly 
precarious, for different reasons in each 
country. The political role of the military is 
prominent but ambiguous, sometimes shor-
ing up the existing order, sometimes press-
ing for radical change. 
The resemblances to Latin American 
patterns are obvious, and a good deal of 
mutual political-ideological-cultural inter-
action might be expected. In the Mediterra-
nean countries, however, the relative size 
and influence of the organized working class 
are greater and the dimensions of the 
marginalized rural and urban groups in 
critical poverty smaller; the political game is 
more structured; the influence of parties 
with mass memberships and coherent ideol-
ogies is stronger; the appeal of populism 
and charismatic leadership is weaker; and 
the capacity of the military to act autono-
mously in pursuit of self-determined politi-
cal missions is somewhat more limited. 
Industrialization in most of the Mediterra-
nean countries is more advanced both 
quantitatively and qualitatively; the national 
bourgeoisie has a higher degree of control 
of* the major enterprises; and some transna-
tional corporations are based in Mediterra-
nean countries. 
In the cyclical swings between authori-
tarian and democratic-pluralist régimes 
characteristic of both regions, Latin Ameri-
ca has in recent years been moving in the 
direction of authoritarianism in the presence 
of conflicts otherwise unmanageable by the 
dominant forces, while the Mediterranean 
countries have been moving in the opposite 
direction. Popular frustration over economic 
recession and rising unemployment, 
swelled by the reflux of workers from the rest 
of Europe, at a time when the societies were 
on the verge of mass consumerism and the 
workers were refusing to accept previous 
wage levels, may be particularly important 
here, whether in providing impetus toward 
structural transformations or in bringing 
about a reversal of the political cycle. 
However, the Mediterranean countries are 
complexly committed to a world order and a 
European order that penalize deviations 
from pluralist democracy in politics and from 
openness to international market forces in 
the economy. The leaders of the mass 
political movements ideologically commit-
ted to structural transformation are evidently 
well aware of the constraints presented by 
the international order and by the consump-
tion expectations of different classes within 
the countries. Thus, their programmes and 
tactics become more cautious to the extent 
that governmental power becomes a real 
possibility for them. At the same time, 
smaller movements at both ends of the 
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political spectrum that refuse to accept the 
constraints increasingly resort to disruptive 
or terrorist tactics. 
3. The socialist 'camps' 
Seeds of change in the Second World' of 
industrialized countries whose dominant 
forces identify them as socialist and view 
development from a Marxist-Leninist per-
spective can be discussed with relative 
brevity. The present section focuses on the 
probable implications for Latin America of 
internal changes in national societies in the 
rest of the world. Latin American interac-
tions with the Second World, in spite of the 
presence in the region of one country 
committed to Marxist-Leninist socialism, are 
relatively restricted. Even the currents of 
opinion that seek radically different styles of 
development now find more in common 
with similar currents in the First World and 
in the remainder of the Third World than in 
the institutionalized socialism of the Second 
World. The appeal of the industrialized 
socialist countries as models for the Good 
Society seems to be static or declining in 
spite of their demonstrable achievements 
and their deliberate competition for accep-
tance as models. 
Moreover, it is harder to identify the 
significant internal seeds of change in the 
socialist countries and assess their capacity 
for growth than in the case of the countries 
discussed above. The dominant forces are 
better able to control or conceal their 
manifestations. For some time the Second 
World will probably be able to transmit to 
the Third World a narrower and more 
coherent range of messages, and to accept 
fewer stimuli to change from it, than will the 
industrialized market-economy countries, 
but sudden changes in the messages and 
stimuli or an increasing diversification and 
contradictoriness cannot be ruled out. 
The Second World is notoriously divid-
ed into two rival camps that agree in very 
little except in their rejection of capitalist 
organization of production and in the indis-
pensabili ty of Marxism-Leninism as a theo-
retical framework for policy. Yugoslavia 
seemed for a time to offer another model of 
particular interest to semi-industrialized 
Third World countries, but its external 
influence has waned. Yugoslavia's expe-
rience in decentralized workers' manage-
ment and the combination of market incen-
tives with socialist central planning has been 
ambiguous; and the seeds of change now 
visible suggest that the national society has 
not overcome the sources of tension common 
to the semi-industrialized labour-exporting 
tourism-dependent Mediterranean coun-
tries. 
The first major camp, that of the U.S. S.R. 
and its European associates, seems to have 
entered a period of routinized imposition of 
stereotypes concerning the style of develop-
ment and the level of human welfare 
achieved. Reform initiatives that seemed 
promising during the 1960s have been ruled 
out as dangerous to the system of political 
domination, and the national régimes and 
societies have evolved with varying degrees 
of rigidity or flexibility within the limits of 
the system. The countries are moving halt-
ingly toward the achievement of consumer 
societies similar to those now undergoing 
cultural mutations elsewhere. This trend has 
several features: (i) a raising of consumption 
levels and introduction of durable consumer 
goods officially planned and controlled; (ii) 
an infiltration of cultural-recreational tastes 
and aspirations, particularly among urban 
youth, that is disapproved but largely uncon-
trollable; (iii) a proliferation of illicit or 
unrecognized systems for the production 
and distribution of consumer goods and 
services that parallels the phenomena of 
'black' labour escaping regulation and taxa-
tion in the market-economy welfare States. 
Under these conditions, cultural influences, 
including forms of dissidence, from the 
richer consumer societies are better able to 
penetrate the socialist societies than the 
latter are to exert counter-influences. The 
long experience of austerity does not seem to 
have generated creative life-styles, but a 
h idden appetite that emerges to the extent 
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that real consumption opportunities appear. 
Several factors hamper the movement 
toward the consumer society: (i) the lagging 
productivity of agriculture, making the 
achievement of a varied diet precarious, 
increasingly dependent on external sup-
plies, and politically neuralgic; (ii) the low 
capacity of the planning system to improve 
consumer goods production, distribution 
and responsiveness to consumer tastes; (iii) 
chronic problems of work incentives and so-
cietal participation associated with a long his-
tory of routinized and centralized mobilization 
and exhortation; and (iv) the need to devote 
relatively high proportions of the national 
income to armaments and heavy industry 
related to armaments in order to meet pre-
vailing conceptions of the obligations of a 
world power and match a rival enjoying a 
much higher per capita income level. 
In the European parts of this socialist 
camp low birth rates over a long period are 
now resulting in nearly stationary and aging 
labour forces and the beginning of labour 
transfers from less industrialized socialist 
countries or peripheral zones of the same 
countries, supplementing previous flows of 
rural labour into industry. Pressures on 
women to enter the labour force have been 
constant, and the high participation of 
women, along with urban housing shortages, 
has contributed to the low birth rates. 
Recent trends of particular importance 
in the smaller countries of this camp include: 
(i) increasing reliance on mass tourism from 
Western Europe as a source of foreign 
exchange; (ii) increasing receptivity to trans-
national enterprises offering technological 
innovations and exportable products in 
exchange for an entry into new markets and a 
low-wage, dependable , relatively well-qual-
ified labour force. Both trends point to 
increasing dependence on cultural and tech-
nological innovations from the market-ori-
en ted consumer societies. 
In the second camp China stands alone, 
with a unique combination of advanced 
industrial-technological capacity, huge pop-
ulation, low income levels and peasant 
majority that differentiates it both from the 
first socialist camp and from the increasing 
number of small non-industrialized Third 
World countries whose dominant forces 
have chosen variants of Marxism-Leninism 
as frames of reference for policy. In recent 
years the Chinese socialist style of develop-
ment has manifested an innovative capacity 
greater than that of the first socialist camp, 
with periods of consolidation-bureaucrati-
zation alternating with periods of revolution-
ary ferment generated by poorly understood 
combinations of stimuli from above and 
pressures from below. It is much better 
shielded from the heterogeneous influences 
emanating from mutating consumer soci-
eties than is the Soviet-Central European 
style. The sheer impossibility of substituting 
diversified industrial consumer goods in-
centives for shared frugality in a population 
such as the Chinese, the smallness of the 
groups even aware of other life-styles, and 
the capacity of the leadership to generate 
compelling national objectives should com-
bine to preserve the coherence of the style 
for some time to come, although not neces-
sarily with the kind of conflictive innova-
tiveness with which it has been associated. 
The Chinese style of development, or 
rather the idealized versions of it current 
abroad, has two facets associated with the 
alternation mentioned above and appealing 
to completely different currents of opinion 
in the rest of the world: (i) the frugal, 
egalitarian, resource-conserving, orderly, 
peasant-based social order, generating in-
novations in local participation and labour-
intensive production but otherwise conform-
ist, zealously practising family planning, 
attractive to frustrated developmentalists of 
many political complexions; (ii) the 'cultural 
revolutionary' challenge to political gradual-
ism, bourgeois life-styles, bureaucratization 
and imperialism, accompanied by an apoc-
alyptic vision of the future, inspiring the 
Maoist movements outside China and espe-
cially attractive to minorities among univer-
sity-educated youth. 
China has also been crucially important 
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to the advocates of 'another development', 
both as a source of concrete prescriptions for 
rural transformation and as the only plausi-
ble demonstration (other than Tanzania) that 
a real national society might set out seriously 
to realize their frugal egalitarian utopia. The 
seeds of change now visible in China, and 
particularly the Chinese revelations of the 
origins in political factional struggle and the 
high costs of certain manifestations of tech-
nological voluntarism and anti-élitism, sug-
gest that China, like the U.S.S.R. before it, 
will decline in plausibility as a utopia, or as a 
scene of Manichean conflicts between 
champions of 'good' egalitarian-participa-
tory and 'evil ' technocratic-centralist policy 
l ines. The warnings of the Chinese them-
selves that their experience is not a model for 
the transformation of other societies will 
have to be taken to heart. 
China will retain enormous interest for 
study of the interplay of political, economic 
and cultural factors in the socialist transfor-
mation of real societies, especially in regard 
to the management of communications be-
tween national centre and periphery in 
circumstances in which mobilization of the 
masses has a high priority, peasant cultures 
and values are undergoing complex muta-
tions, and messages travelling in both direc-
tions are bound to become exaggerated and 
distorted by factors unrelated to their origi-
nal purpose. 
4. Regions of the Third World other 
than Latin America, 
It is legitimate to insist, in considering the 
application of the principles of 'another 
development ' to Latin America, that the 
relatively urbanized and industrialized posi-
tion of the larger countries of the region, and 
their complex involvement in the present 
international order, imply quite different 
options and constraints from those facing the 
poorer predominantly rural parts of the 
world. The present paper has already sug-
gested that mutations in the central market-
economy countries are particularly relevant 
to the possibilities for transformation in 
Latin America. However, it would be equal-
ly over-simplified to suppose a clear-cut 
dividing line between 'semi-developed' Latin 
America and the rest of the Third World. In 
differing ways, most of the other Third World 
countries are also complexly involved in the 
international order. The aspiration to endo-
genous rural-community-oriented styles of 
development in a good many of these coun-
tries has stronger justifications than in Latin 
America, but it is not clear whether the resis-
tances to such styles from the unevenly 
modernized social, political and economic 
structures will be any less formidable. 
The Third World national societies 
outside Latin America can be classified 
according to several criteria, all of which 
have some relevance for present purposes: 
(i) according to the size of the populations 
and their economies, and thus to their 
weight within the world order; (ii) according 
to geographical and cultural proximity and 
consequent intensity of interactions; (iii) 
according to endowment with or lack of raw 
materials in sufficient international demand 
to give them strong bargaining positions; (iv) 
according to political regimes (stable or 
unstable authoritarian, one-party mobiliza-
tion, negotiated balance between ethnic-
religious-linguistic groups, democratic-plu-
ralist); (v) according to levels of per capita 
income, urbanization and industrialization 
(that is, approximation to patterns of semi-
development); and (vi) according to the 
system or style of development preferred by 
the forces controlling the State (liberal-
capitalist, State-capitalist, socialist, various 
hybrids). At present, a comparison of clas-
sifications according to these different crite-
ria would show more incongruities than 
regularities. In particular, the adoption by 
forces controlling the State of a capitalist or 
socialist or hybrid strategy for development 
has become increasingly divorced from the 
objective conditions. The worldwide repro-
duction of the European model of the nation-
State accompanying the liquidation of colo-
nialism, in regions in which traditional 
30 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 7 / April 1979 
political loyalties had quite different bases 
(dynastic-absolutist, feudal, tribal, etc.) has 
been fruitful of anomalies. 
For present purposes, the following 
five-fold semi-regional classification may be 
most suggestive: the Arab States (including 
those of North Africa) and Iran; Africa south 
of the Sahara; the South Asian States with 
huge populations and particularly low in-
comes; the States of Southeast Asia; the is-
land mini-States of the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans and the Caribbean. Each group is 
internally heterogeneous but has common 
traits not shared to the same degree with the 
rest of the Third World, and interactions 
within the groups—connective as well as co-
operative— are more intense than inter-
actions with the Third World as a whole. 
(a) In many respects the Arab-Iranian 
group has more in common with Latin 
America than have the other groups: long 
traditions of urban political-economic-
cultural dominance, very wide differences 
be tween countries in stages of economic 
growth, in degrees of urbanization-modern-
ization, and in political régimes, combined 
with strong cultural-linguistic ties, well 
established mechanisms for group action, 
and also deeply-rooted sources of intra-
group conflict. The larger countries, includ-
ing oil exporters such as Iran as well as 
importers such as Egypt and Morocco, have 
reached patterns of dependent semi-devel-
opment similar to those of Latin America. 
T h e upper-income strata have broadened 
and diversified; the gap between them and 
the lower strata in the income distribution 
has widened; 'modern' consumer societies 
for minorities have emerged; and a marginal-
ized under-employed labour force is ex-
panding. 
The degree of voluntarism and diversity 
in governmental choices of styles of devel-
opment is a good deal higher than in Latin 
America. However, the non-capitalist devel-
opment strategies that have emerged in 
several countries have been relatively cen-
tralized, bureaucratized, oriented to the 
introduction of advanced technologies in 
industry and agriculture, heavily dependent 
on imported equipment and specialists in 
the oil-exporting countries and on external 
financial aid in the others. The advocates of 
'another development ' have not found con-
genial innovative and participatory styles in 
this group of countries.19 In any case, 
countries in this group seem to have a high 
propensity toward the exertion of pressures 
for change in the international order as a 
whole, owing partly to oil resources and 
consequent availability of funds that govern-
ments can allocate with fewer constraints 
than elsewhere, partly to strategic geopoliti-
cal location, and partly to the contradictory 
combination of militant solidarity and vio-
lent factionalism that derives from the Israel-
Palestine problem. 
(b) In Africa south of the Sahara ques-
tions of national identity and viability are 
particularly prominent, with the region 
fragmented into a large number of relatively 
small States, most of them with very short 
histories within their present boundaries, 
few of them internally homogeneous, few of 
them with human or material resources 
sufficient for 'development' as this has 
conventionally been understood. Thus, ex-
ternal aid and regional solidarity, the latter 
partly to insure that 'aid' will not perpetuate 
dependency and conflict between clients of 
different industrialized States, are particu-
larly necessary and particularly difficult to 
obtain and manage. Initiatives for regional 
unity coexist uneasily with centrifugal pres-
sures within countries, with the emergence 
in some countries of erratic personal rule and 
also with aspirations to autonomous national 
styles of development, usually labelled 
'socialist', and intended to bypass the im-
practicability of conventional development 
styles and supply cultural-psychological 
compensations. Political-bureaucratic-mili-
tary élites (with roles not clearly differen-
1 9In assessing the purportedly socialist as well as 
the market-economy countries in the group, Samir 
Amin observes that the Arab world is already markedly 
urbanized; its petite bourgeoisie, a reactionary class 
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tiated) have a relatively free hand to choose 
such styles because of the weakness of other 
social forces. At the same time, the weaknes-
ses of the State machinery, the limitations of 
communication between the élites and the 
mainly rural masses, the dependence of the 
economies on raw material exports and 
external subsidies, and the adoption by the 
élites of consumerist ways of life that require 
concentration in their hands of the proceeds 
of the exports and coercion of the peasant 
producers result in real styles that various 
analysts identify as 'bureaucratic-capitalist' 
rather than 'socialist'. Only one of the 
national strategies, that of Tanzania, has 
attracted the advocates of 'another develop-
ment ' as a potential model for participatory 
egalitarian transformation, and even here 
the constraints of economic dependence, 
meagre resource endowment, and faulty 
communications between innovating élite 
and masses remain inhibitive. While a few of 
the African countries (Nigeria, Zaire, Zam-
bia) have achieved relatively strong posi-
tions as suppliers of important raw materials, 
none of them as yet has been able to 
industrialize to a significant degree or to 
achieve a relative weight in the region 
comparable to those of some Arab and Latin 
American countries in their regions. 
(c) The larger South Asian States are, in 
terms of per capita income and absolute size 
of populations at extremely low levels of 
productivity and consumption, the 'least-
developed ' in the world. (For present purpo-
ses, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangla-
desh belong to this group; Sri Lanka, in spite 
of its geographical location, has more in 
integrated into the capitalist system, is highly devel-
oped; its rural areas are dominated by the knlaks, 
beneficiaries of the bourgeois land reforms; and all this 
is reflected in profound deculturation, great moral and 
intellectual disarray, in short, all the signs of lumpen-
Europeanization. And he goes on to add that hope lies 
simply and solely in the fact that the manifold contra-
dictions bred of this dependent development can no 
longer be overcome. (See Samir Amin, La nation arabe: 
nationalisme et luttes de classes, Paris, Editions de 
Minuit , 1976, pp . 150-151.) 
common with the next group to be dis-
cussed.) If international aid were distributed 
according to a uniform means test, the 
countries in this group would receive most of 
it. At the same time, all of them have 
industrial sectors and export activities 
which, while small in relation to their 
populations, are fairly large in absolute 
terms or compared with those of other Third 
World countries. In India, in particular, the 
combination of an enormous population, a 
substantial industrial base, and strong politi-
cal and administrative institutions supports a 
position of considerable importance in the 
world order, in spite of the extreme poverty 
of the majority. Structurally heterogeneous 
development, as in Latin America, has 
generated its own market and its own vested 
interests in perpetuation of the same style. 
In South Asia, the conservative character of 
the forces dominant over the rural majority 
props up this line of development politically 
while hampering it economically. Up to the 
present, socialist-reformist aspirations of the 
national régimes have led to bureaucratiza-
tion and the construction of complex systems 
of special privileges rather than to major 
changes in economic and social realities, as 
was documented in Gunnar Myrdal's Asian 
Drama (1968). 
The warnings now current of critical 
poverty deteriorating into mass famines 
apply more plausibly to South Asia and to 
parts of Africa than to other regions of the 
Third World. In Africa, the populations 
threatened are relatively small, and although 
relief action is hindered by their geograph-
ical remoteness and other factors, famines 
can be arrested by international aid without 
unmanageable costs. If the international 
sources of aid do not act or act ineffectually, 
as in the Sahel and Ethiopian droughts of the 
early 1970s, the international repercussions 
of famines in isolated thinly populated areas 
are weak. In South Asia, the overall capacity 
tò increase food production faster than 
population is not yet exhausted, as the 
statistics of the most recent years show, but 
the governments have permanent difficul-
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ties in managing production incentives, 
prices to the consumer and distribution 
networks so as to reconcile their various 
objectives, and remain dependent on subsi-
dized food imports to meet shortfalls. Vari-
ous prognoses indicate that over the long 
term only a comprehensively planned com-
bination of agrarian transformation, popula-
tion control, and very large-scale external aid 
will be able to prevent an unmanageably 
wide gap between food needs and food 
supplies.20 Even in the short term, a few bad 
crop years might face the international food 
distribution system with a crisis that it would 
not meet, particularly if production were to 
s lump in the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 
South Asia simultaneously. A famine deci-
mating the populations of some or all of the 
countries in this group would follow. The 
shock for the international order and for the 
region itself would be severe, but the 
consequences are hard to assess, and the 
kind of chaotic general collapse sometimes 
predicted seems unlikely. One might expect 
an exacerbation of several different trends in 
the central countries as well as in South Asia 
—toward horrified rejection of the prevail-
ing international order and consumerist 
styles of development, toward greater na-
tional selfishness and insistence on popula-
tion control as the only solution, toward 
more repressive régimes protecting the lives 
and property of the better-off South Asians 
with assistance from some of the central 
countries, and toward protracted revolution-
ary struggles aimed at the implantation of 
egalitarian austerity. The past experience of 
China as well as India demonstrates that 
famines in peasant populations do not by 
themselves bring about either the collapse 
or the transformation of the pre-existing 
social and political order. 
T h e poverty of the masses of South Asia 
and the increasing implausibility of expec-
See, for example, the scenarios in Mihajlo Me-
sarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning 
Point, op.cit. 
tations that industrialization and agricultural 
modernization can overcome this poverty 
have been crucial to demonstrations of the 
necessity of 'another development' . At the 
same time, conceptions of rural community 
potential for endogenous self-reliant devel-
opment stemming from Gandhism have 
been nearly as influential as the Chinese 
experience in shaping the more concrete 
prescriptions. It must be remembered that in 
the 1950s the Government of India hoped to 
combine development through industrial-
ization with large-scale programmes of rural 
community development, using trained 
change agents to stimulate innovation, co-
operation and self-help in the villages. 
Neither these programmes nor the more 
recent introduction of high-yielding crop 
varieties (the so-called Green Revolution) 
seem to have brought the rural societies any 
closer to the ideals of social equality and 
collective effort. The rural power holders, 
through their links with the national power 
structure, have consistently been able to 
manipulate the rural programmes, whether 
the latter were participation i st or techno-
cratic in orientation. Arguments for endo-
genously-inspired collective rural develop-
ment are now being made with renewed 
fervor, and local initiatives corresponding to 
the ideals continue to appear, but the way 
to multiply these initiatives to a scale 
matching the needs for rural transformation 
without their undergoing bureaucratic stan-
dardization or capture by local vested inter-
ests seems no clearer than before. 
(d) The national societies of Southeast 
Asia have in common medium size, rela-
tively satisfactory ratios between land and 
population that are now endangered by high 
rates of population increase, and peasant 
majorities which, except in some war-
devastated or otherwise disadvantaged in-
ternal zones, have not reached the depths of 
poverty and precarious food supply in which 
their counterparts in South Asia are sub-
merged. Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Sri Lanka belong to this group. Indonesia 
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has many traits in common with it in spite ol 
its larger population and the higher propor-
tion of this population in critical poverty. 
Singapore and Hong Kong, as city States 
without a rural hinterland, are comparable to 
certain rapidly industrializing urban centres 
oí the other countries, but not to the 
countries themselves. 
Southeast Asia now comprises States 
that have embarked vigorously on depen-
dent capitalist styles of development (the 
Phil ippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, as well as Indonesia) and States 
with Socialist styles closer to the Chinese 
than to the Soviet model (although not 
necessarily in their political affiliations) that 
have emerged following prolonged and very 
destructive periods of warfare. Two coun-
tries fall outside this dichotomy; Burma has a 
self-isolated 'military socialist' regime sui 
generis that has excluded dependent indus-
trialization and urban consumer-society 
modernization and has relied on the peasant 
majority's ability to produce surpluses of 
rice, without, apparently, achieving signif-
icant innovations in social relations or 
production. Sri Lanka since the 1940s has 
achieved a range of social services and 
consumption subsidies unique among low-
income non-socialist countries. The expe-
rience of Sri Lanka is of considerable 
interest for 'another development ' . First, it 
has demonstrated that redistributive pol-
icies for the satisfaction of basic needs can be 
materially and administratively feasible in a 
poor country with a rural majority. Secondly, 
it has demonstrated that such policies can 
emerge from open political competition for 
mass support, at formidable costs of several 
kinds but without necessarily incurring the 
breakdowns that have been common to 
populist régimes in countries with consid-
erably higher income levels. Thirdly, it has 
demonstrated that, within a dependent cap-
italist raw-mate rial-export-oriented eco-
nomic framework, the inhibiting effects of 
such policies on accumulation and pro-
duction incentives, while formidable, can be 
bearable and compatible with a certain 
amount of economic growth over an extend-
ed period. Lastly, on the negative side, Sri 
Lanka has demonstrated that neither polit-
ical democracy nor development planning 
offer effective ways of overcoming the short-
comings of the welfare State, in the absence 
of a transformation of social structures, 
values and incentives. Political and eco-
nomic difficulties have been recurrent and 
increasingly severe, but no practicable and 
widely acceptable alternatives to the present 
system seem to be in sight. 
In the market-economy countries of 
Southeast Asia income concentration seems 
to be on the increase; minority consumer 
societies are becoming highly conspicuous, 
with the expected accompaniment of grow-
ing underemployed rural and urban margin-
al strata. The rise of mass movements of 
educated youth rejecting the style of devel-
opment and trying to mobilize the disad-
vantaged urban and rural masses against it 
has been particularly pronounced in these 
countries; while movements of this kind 
have been repressed and silenced in various 
countries, their reappearance is probable. 
In the three socialist countries, and 
particularly in Vietnam, the aftermath of war 
and the paucity of external aid have left no 
alternative to a frugal, self-reliant, disci-
plined style of development, and the war 
itself generated forms of mobilization and 
control attuned to such a style. The fact of 
victory against overwhelming odds has giv-
en this style considerable potential attrac-
tion for seekers of 'another development' in 
other relatively small and poor countries, but 
it is not yet clear whether the Southeast 
Asian socialist countries will over the long 
term achieve innovative and participatory 
patterns and exert influence distinct from 
the Chinese and Soviet models. 
The geographic position of Southeast 
Asia and the declining ability of central 
countries to enforce hegemony over it gives 
the dominant forces of the countries, wheth-
er capitalist or socialist, a good deal of 
latitude in modifying the terms of external 
dependency by varying their relationships 
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with China, the United States, the U.S.S.K., 
and japan, so that the possibilities for inno-
vations in styles ofdevelopment are relative-
ly favourable. The deliberate self-isolation 
of Cambodia and the forced transfer to 
agricultural labour of its urban population 
show the degree of voluntarism now feasible 
for the régimes of small countries in zones 
falling outside the sphere of influence of any 
one central power. The experiences of Bur-
ma and Sri Lanka are less extreme but much 
longer-continued demonstrations that orig-
inal paths can be pursued without external 
sanctions. In the more aggressively market-
oriented countries one finds governmental 
initiatives designed to counteract the polar-
izing and marginalizing forces of the style of 
development (through agrarian reforms, em-
ployment creation, participatory mecha-
nisms, conciliation of the disaffected youth, 
campaigns against corruption and concen-
trated wealth) and tactics aimed at accom-
modation with socialist neighbours, com-
bined with the maintenance of régimes 
sufficiently authoritarian to smoother internal 
conflicts, guarantee stable rules of the game 
and offer a dependable low-wage labour 
force to transnational enterprises. It is signif-
icant that several of these countries have 
recently been favoured areas of external 
investment, because of their resource en-
dowment , because of confidence that their 
dominant forces can maintain order, and 
because of expectations of growing internal 
markets for consumer goods. The same is not 
true of the South Asian countries, because 
their problems have increasingly seemed 
insuperable within a peripheral capitalist 
framework. It is likely that Vietnam will be 
able to attract similar transnational interest if 
its authorities find this desirable. 
(e) The scattered island mini-States of 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the 
Caribbean have in common plantation econ-
omies, now in many cases undergoing a 
transformation to tourist economies; eth-
nically heterogeneous populations deriving 
largely from successive importations of 
plantation labour; weak national identities; 
dependence on external stimuli and con-
straints so pronounced as almost to rule out 
the possibility of autonomous styles of 
development. These disadvantages may 
paradoxically, as in the case of some African 
States, stimulate an intellectual and popular 
striving for 'something else' in the form of 
endogenous life-styles, cultural nationalism, 
xenophobia and charismatic leadership to 
compensate for the lack of preconditions for 
conventional development processes and 
strategies. The mini-States are extreme cases 
in the present crisis of the nation-State and 
the international order made up of nation-
States. The number of very small units 
continues to increase at a time when the 
separate viability of even the larger nation-
States is called in question. The mini-States 
depend for protection of their rights and 
support of their precarious economies on a 
system of international organizations and 
meetings continually becoming more com-
plex, which places on them heavy burdens 
of representation and diversion of their 
attention from internal tasks, and which they 
complicate further by their efforts to partic-
ipate. 
5. Latin America: a future open to 
choice or hazard? 
The preceding pages have implicitly posed 
the questions: What are the alternatives 
open to Latin America in a world of national 
societies undergoing such diverse and mu-
tually contradictory mutations ? What will be 
the range of alternatives in a few years? To 
what extent is the future predetermined by 
Latin America's peripheral semi-develop-
ment, and by the commitment of its domi-
nant social forces to the consumer society 
and to the new international division of 
labour that the transnational enterprises are 
shaping? 
The current personification of the coun-
tries of the region as an international middle 
class within the capitalist world order is an 
analogy that cannot be pushed very far. A 
'middle class' composed of imitative, strue-
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turally heterogeneous national societies 
implies internal contradictions and tensions, 
a precarious balance between the worlds of 
'rich' and 'poor' countries, quite different 
from the supposed progressive and stabiliz-
ing roles of middle classes within national 
societies. It is evident, however, that the 
special relationships —cultural as well as 
economic and political— between Latin 
America and the central, market-economy 
countries make the mutations in these 
countries of crucial importance for assess-
ment of the feasibility of major changes in 
Latin American styles of development. Even 
the smaller and poorer Latin American 
countries have appreciable 'modern' urban 
supers tinctures and classes looking to the 
First World for models. The governments of 
the First World are more disposed and better 
able to hinder the emergence of radically 
different styles of development in Latin 
America than in Africa and Asia. 
Thus, the internal as well as the external 
balance of power suggests that in most of 
Latin America during the immediate future, 
demands for equality for nation-States with-
in a reformed international economic order 
will continue to have the upper hand over 
demands for equality for human beings 
within transformed national societies. The 
blueprints for 'another development' will 
still play a mainly ornamental role in inter-
governmental deliberations concentrated on 
bargaining tactics and justifications for de-
mands vis-à-vis the central countries. These 
deliberations, moreover, may become in-
creasingly divorced from real capabilities as 
'transnationalization' of the national socie-
ties advances. 
If the First World should recover and 
maintain sufficient prosperity, self-confi-
dence and technological innovative ness 
during the remainder of the twentieth 
century, one might envisage two plausible 
futures for the countries of Latin America. 
Either might be accompanied by political 
struggles as persistent and disruptive as 
those of recent years, but without basic 
changes in the internal distribution of 
power. Either might be accompanied by 
considerable gains in national income levels 
and in the stock of productive capital without 
any narrowing of the income gap between 
Latin America and the central countries or 
any significant reduction in technological 
and financial dependence. 
One future would be a projection of 
present styles of development, accompanied 
by an intensification of the efforts that have 
been made intermittently during the past 
half-century to counteract the 'concentrating 
and excluding' logic of these styles and 
democratize the consumer society. Govern-
ments would strive to capture somewhat 
larger proportions of increments in the 
national income and curb the consumption 
of the upper income strata to some extent, so 
as to raise the rate of productive investment. 
They would continue to respond to the 
employment pressures of educated youth 
and the pressures of organized workers to 
raise their share of income, but they would 
also allocate resources and seek more effec-
tive policies to bring the under-employed, 
under-educated and under-nourished mas-
ses into some kind of productive and 
participatory relationship to the national 
society. It hardly needs demonstration that 
the achievement of an ideal welfare State 
reconciling the multiple objectives and 
heterogeneous pressures is unlikely. Never-
theless, present national income levels and 
the apparent capacity of the State to inter-
vene in the economy and administer social 
services support arguments that a good deal 
more can be done along these lines than has 
been, without drastically curtailing the con-
sumption of the rich or preventing capital 
accumulation. In a prosperous and expand-
ing world economy, the governments of the 
central countries and the transnational en-
terprises might be expected to look benevo-
lently on welfare State policies in the 
periphery —if only as acceptable alterna-
tives to more radical policies— and to give 
them some support through their credit and 
trade policies. The two safety valves of 
expansion of bureaucratic employment for 
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the middle strata and public works employ-
ment plus consumption subsidies for the 
poor might then continue to function for 
some time and permit the maintenance of 
formally democratic political procedures. 
Such a future can be criticized as unjust, 
wasteful of societal resources, unsustainable 
over the long term and uninspiring in 
comparison with the vision of 'another 
development ' , but it may continue for some 
time to be the only practicable path for 
governments seeking to mitigate the human 
cost of a style of development that they 
cannot transform. Neither the advocates of 
'another development ' nor the ideological 
enemies of dependent capitalist semi-devel-
opment have as yet been able to demonstrate 
plausibly how real social forces and real 
governments might be able to manage affairs 
differently. The more difficult immediate 
questions for such a future then lie in the 
willingness of the dominant forces in Latin 
America to give more than lip-service to 
welfare objectives and in the ability of the 
State to secure a certain degree of autonomy 
in pursuing such objectives. The following 
quotation sums up the reasons for doubt 
whether the national societies, if the internal 
and external distribution of power remains 
unchanged, will be able to advance even this 
far in the direction of 'another development': 
"For example, is the Mexican State 
—a State constitutionally and rhetor-
ically committed to social justice; 
massively involved in the develop-
ment process; overseeing an economy 
that is profoundly penetrated and 
multinationalized; with a moderniz-
ing industrial sector, export-oriented 
agriculture, currency tied to the dol-
lar, inflationary pressures, and bal-
ance of payments problems — any more 
'autonomous' from domestic anti-
egalitarian class forces today than forty 
years ago? Could even the most 
progressive Mexican régime imagin-
able consistently decide in favor of 
impoverished ejidatarios when the 
interests of Mexican and international 
agribusiness are at stake? The an-
swers are obvious for the Mexican case 
... but they may not be much less 
controversial for any régime, no mat-
ter how 'progressive' its expressed 
commitments, as long as these kinds 
of developmental rules and class 
alliances guide the process of accu-
mulation and distribution."21 
The other plausible future, under the 
supposition of confirmed world hegemony 
by the present centres, has been described 
most implacably by Helio Jaguaribe: 
"In the new emerging class of inter-
national 'executives', who are coming 
to be recruited from the local middle 
classes of countries under United 
States hegemony, through a previous 
educational and training program that 
makes their standards of work and 
behavior conform to the American 
executive patterns, we can see some-
thing equivalent to the Roman class of 
équités, who were also, after some 
time, recruited from the provincial 
middle classes through a previous 
process of Romanization. The new 
équités are likely to form a depend-
able, efficient, and honest bureau-
cracy, much better qualified to manage 
the provincial affairs than the relative-
ly inept local élites, who were led to 
choose the dependent way because of 
their own incapacity for autonomous 
development. The provincial form of 
dependency would, therefore, im-
prove both the self-support of prov-
inces and their dependence on the 
metropolis, enlarging, along the way, 
the employment conditions for the 
local middle class, to which the new 
international executive careers would 
be opened. ... However, ... all avail-
able evidence, from both historical 
21See Richard R. Fagen, "Studying Latin American 
Politics: Some Implications of a Dependencia Ap-
proach", Latin American Research Review, XII, 2,1977, 
pp. 14-15. 
REINVENTING DEVELOPMENT: UTOPIAS DEVISED BY COMMITTEES / Marshall Wolfe 37 
and current practices, indicates that 
the process of incorporation of depen-
dent peoples into a more powerful 
and culturally advanced society is 
made at the expense of the great 
unskilled masses of the former. ... In a 
cybernetic society, where unskilled 
labour is almost unnecessary and 
where the cost of education is so high 
... it is likely that the great 'demo-
graphic surpluses' of the provinces will 
be condemned to gradual extermina-
tion. ... The provincial administra-
tions of the near future will probably 
be led to establish internal controls for 
population movement, obliging the 
rural masses to remain in the country-
side, and thereby create a sort of 
reserve of natives, whose admission to 
the modern sectors of their countries 
will be contingent on the real increase 
in demand for labor in the cities. 
Malnutrition and the lack of appropri-
ate sanitary conditions and medical 
care will gradually reduce these pop-
ulations."22 
An indispensable precondition for 
ei ther of these futures is the persistence of 
world centres transmitting coherent mes-
sages to the dominant forces in the semi-
developed periphery and able to exercise 
hegemony for coherent purposes. The dis-
cussion of seeds of change has indicated that 
this precondition cannot be counted on, 
even i fone leaves aside the strictly econom-
ic vicissitudes that now confront the 
centres, the energy shortages, the ecological 
constraints, and the precariousness of'com-
petit ive détente ' between the First and 
Second Worlds. The central countries are 
unlikely to provide a stable supportive 
environment either for the gradual consoli-
dation of welfare States in the periphery or 
for the imposition of political and economic 
See Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A 
General Theory and a Latin American Case Study, 
New York, Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 383-384. 
systems discarding welfare pretensions and 
governed solely by criteria for efficient use 
of resources for the benefit of the power-
holders. The conception of development as a 
striving to catch up with the world leaders 
will no doubt persist for some time but will 
become less and less tenable. 
The prospect, then, is for a highly 
indeterminate future in which the central 
countries will transmit continually changing 
combinations of stimuli, shocks and inhibi-
tions to the rest of the world (and, of course, 
to one another) and in which the rest of the 
world will make equally confused and 
shifting responses as one pressure or another 
comes uppermost. In spite of governmental 
aspirations to stabilize the periphery, the 
centres will not be able to avoid destabiliza-
tion. The sudden impact of revelations in 
certain central countries of bribery by trans-
national enterprises and of subversion by 
intelligence agencies, both byproducts of 
domestic political struggles and resistances 
to the prevailing style of development 
illustrate the unpredictableness and diver-
sity of the accidents, in the road ahead of any 
central strategy for domination. 
While the governments of the central 
countries will go on minimizing the scope of 
confrontations and making whatever conces-
sions they feel they can afford, their actions 
will continue to respond more to domestic 
considerations (e.g., protecting supplies of 
key raw materials; satisfying the demands of 
the military-industrial complex and the 
organized workers; curbing the tactics of the 
transnational enterprises sufficiently to 
keep them from nullifying governmental 
employment, balance-of-payments and 
other objectives) and to rivalries among 
themselves than to the needs and demands 
of the periphery. 
At the same time, the increasing diver-
sity and militancy of the domestic social 
forces intervening in central-country poli-
tics, culture, and economic organization 
introduces wider opportunities for social 
forces in the periphery, in power or out, 
seeking more advantageous terms of depen-
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deney or freedom from interference in 
transforming the national style of develop-
ment . They can find alternative allies in 
different sectors of the State apparatus of the 
former countries, in their legislative bodies, 
in their political parties and trade unions, 
and in a wide range of organized groups 
promoting causes from environmental pro-
tection to human rights and equality of the 
sexes. An increasing internationalization of 
ideological-promotional movements and in-
terest groups may co-exist uneasily with the 
increasing penetration of transnational en-
terprises, increasingly imitative consumer-
ism, and increasing dependency through 
indebtedness — and also with rising insis-
tence . on nationalism and self-reliance in 
styles of development. 
Some few of the smaller industrialized 
countries of Europe and some of the 'high-
income dependent ' countries outside Eu-
rope will probably advance farther in vi-
carious utopianism, the promotion of 'an-
other development ' in the Third World, 
albeit in practice having to concentrate their 
hopes and their aid on a few promising 
national societies. Even in these latter cases, 
it is unlikely that popular support for 
'another development ' will become strong 
enough to permit any government to under-
take aid on a scale seriously depressing 
domestic levels of living, as the universalist 
versions of 'another development' imply. 
In the ease of Latin America, the 
influence of mutations in the central market-
economy countries will undoubtedly contin-
ue to be stronger than the influence of 
mutations elsewhere. Interchanges with 
other Third World regions, while they are on 
the rise, are practically restricted to the 
sectors of government concerned with 
international affairs and development poli-
cy, certain intellectuals and social scientists, 
and the leaders of certain political move-
ments . The proportion of the Latin American 
population, outside the Caribbean sub-
region, that feels kinship with or interest in 
the social changes of Africa and Asia must be 
small. 
The capacity of the two socialist camps 
to influence the course of development in 
Latin America depends partly on their 
demonstration of the viability of non-capital-
ist development, as their reality is filtered 
through the mass media and the conscious-
ness of different sectors of opinion; partly on 
the strength of disciplined social movements 
identifying themselves with one camp or the 
other; and partly on the ability and willing-
ness of the two camps to offer material and 
technical aid to governments and move-
ments. In the first respect, in recent times 
China has offered a model more accessible 
to very poor predominantly rural societies 
than to relatively urbanized societies. In the 
other two respects, the U.S.S.R. has had the 
advantage, in view of the greater organiza-
tional cohesiveness and working-class base 
of the parties looking to it for guidance and 
in view of its greater industrial and techno-
logical capacity. 
In Latin America during the immediate 
future it is improbable that, except in Cuba, 
the two socialist camps will exert a stronger 
influence than in the past. The two facets of 
the Chinese experience will continue to 
edify different sectors of opinion, whatever 
their fate in China, but the possibility of 
direct borrowing has nearly disappeared. 
Soviet trade relations and technical co-
operation will probably have an appreciable 
but deliberately restricted role in a good 
many countries. The irradiation of Soviet 
internal social trends, however, in the 
absence of unforeseeable changes in their 
present patterns, will be weak, possibly 
serving mainly the advocates of peripheral 
capitalism in their efforts to demonstrate the 
absence of any better alternative. 
Since the beginning of the 1960s Cuba 
has had an important and deliberately 
cultivated role in posing a radically different 
style of development, corresponding in 
many respects to the objectives later pro-
posed for 'another development' , as both 
possible and necessary for Latin America. 
The Cuban experience deserves a more 
detailed assessment than it can be given in 
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the present context.2^ On the one side, Cuba 
has demonstrated that a socialist alternative 
can be viable and capable of satisfying basic 
needs of a previously marginalized popula-
tion to an extent unmatched elsewhere in 
Latin America. On the other side, it has 
achieved this at a price, in terms of extreme 
austerity in consumption, centralization of 
economic and political power, integration 
into one of the world socialist camps, and 
expulsion of the large minority of the 
population unwilling to accept this style of 
development , that is higher than social 
forces likely to take power in any other 
country of the region may be willing or able 
to pay. Marxist-Leninist ideological ortho-
doxy, central planning of the economy, and 
integration with the Soviet camp will not be 
able to isolate Cuba from the 'seeds of 
change ' that have been discussed above, and 
may prove as inhibiting to necessary future 
transformations as the peripheral capitalist 
ties of dependence of the remainder of Latin 
America. 
The argument pursued in this paper 
does not imply that the future of Latin 
America can or will be passively subject to 
destabilizing mutations of the central coun-
tries, or that the repercussions of these 
mutations will soon outweigh the deliberate 
efforts of the centres to shore up peripheral 
capitalism and temper its harshness by 
subsidizing welfare State initiatives. It is 
even possible that variants of the market 
economy and the consumer society will be 
^See Apreciaciones sobre el estilo de desarrollo 
y sobre las principales políticas sociales en Cuba 
(CEPAUMEX/77/22/Rev. 2), May 1978. 
able to maintain themselves successfully in 
Latin America, on their own terms, after 
their decomposition is farther advanced in 
the centres, because of the greater capacity 
of the dominant forces in Latin America to 
repress the contradictions. It is also quite 
likely that the visibility of extreme inequali-
ty and exploitation in Latin America, the 
failure of efforts to transform styles of 
development, the associated repression, 
struggles against repression, and expulsion 
of dissidents to the centres will have a 
significant impact on mutations in the 
centres themselves, providing tactical les-
sons, rallying issues, and grounds for denun-
ciation of the trans national s and the consum-
er society. In one way or another the 
peoples of Latin America are bound to be 
active participants in shaping a future that 
will be confused and conflictive, not prede-
termined by the region's present insertion in 
the international order or the present inabili-
ty of counter-élites to offer convincing 
alternatives. 
The argument does imply that the 
debate over 'another development' is only 
beginning. The inherent compulsion of the 
present system of international organiza-
tions to cast 'another development' in a 
universalist and immediatist mould of 
strategies and plans of action to be agreed on 
by governments tends to devalue it as an 
inspiring myth and relevant utopia by 
inflation and evasiveness; but the basic 
propositions will recur, with changing 
terminology and emphasis, taken up by new 
social forces and movements acquiring 
greater realism and political viability, as the 
various hybrids of the welfare State and the 
repressive State lose credibility. 
